


RS-TND-91-009  
JUNE 1991



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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Nuclear Developments**

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## **N O T I C E**

### **NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS REPORT TO BE RENAMED**

Beginning with JPRS-TND-91-010, the JPRS REPORT: NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS will be renamed JPRS REPORT: PROLIFERATION ISSUES. Its content will remain unchanged except that information on *ballistic missiles* and *biological weapons* will now appear in this report instead of the JPRS REPORT: ARMS CONTROL. This material will be included with other proliferation items under the appropriate geographic heading. Information on treaties governing the production, possession, and use of chemical and biological weapons will continue to appear under appropriate geographic headings in the ARMS CONTROL report.

Subscribers to the NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS report will experience no lapse in receipts when this change takes effect. Subscribers to the ARMS CONTROL report who wish to subscribe to the PROLIFERATION ISSUES report should consult the back cover for subscription information.

# NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS

JPRS-TND-91-009

## CONTENTS

24 June 1991

### AFRICA

#### ZAMBIA

- Mibenge Urges South African Nuclear Compliance [Johannesburg SAPA] ..... 1

### CHINA

- Expert Claims Qinshan Nuclear Plant Safe [Hong Kong ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE] ..... 2  
 Algeria Denies Plan To Make Nuclear Weapons [Beijing Radio] ..... 2  
 Nuclear Technology Transfer Pact With France Signed [XINHUA] ..... 2  
 Envoy Refutes Nuclear Allegations [XINHUA] ..... 2

### EAST ASIA

#### JAPAN

- G-7 'Likely' To Agree on Soviet Atomic Aid [KYODO] ..... 3  
 Ministers Urge Cooperation at IAEA Meeting [KYODO] ..... 3  
 Nakayama Proposes Hastening Chemical Weapons Pact [KYODO] ..... 4

#### NORTH KOREA

- IAEA Reports Pyongyang Ready To Resume Safeguard Talks [KYODO] ..... 4  
 Paper Urges Declaring Peninsula Nuclear-Free Zone [KCNA] ..... 5  
 Underground Nuclear Tests Denied [Moscow International] ..... 5  
 Moscow Commentator on Nuclear Inspection Issue [Moscow International] ..... 5

#### SOUTH KOREA

- DPRK Reportedly To Sign Nuclear Accord ..... 5  
     IAEA Informed [TONG-A ILBO 8 Jun] ..... 5  
     Ministry Urges Unconditional Signing [Seoul Radio] ..... 6  
 Report on Temperatures of North Nuclear Site Disputed [THE KOREA TIMES 17 May] ..... 6  
 DPRK Scholar's Views on Inspection Reported [YONHAP] ..... 7  
 DPRK Reportedly To Build New Scud Missile [YONHAP] ..... 7  
 Editorial Calls for Nuclear-Free Zone on Peninsula [CHOSON ILBO 3 Jun] ..... 8  
 Editorial Urges 'Pressure' on North Over Nuclear Accord [THE KOREA TIMES 7 Jun] ..... 8  
 Ministry Denies DPRK-Libya Scud Contract [YONHAP] ..... 9  
 Study Commissioned on Nuclear Waste Site [YONHAP] ..... 9  
 Official Disputes U.S. Paper's Report on Nuclear Weapons [YONHAP] ..... 10  
 South To Seek Resolution on Inspecting North [YONHAP] ..... 10

### EAST EUROPE

#### BULGARIA

- Kozloduy's Sixth Reactor Reactivated [Sofia Radio] ..... 11

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Radioactive Spill at Jaslovske Bohunice Plant ..... 11  
     IAEA Rates as 3d Degree Incident [CTK] ..... 11  
     Report on Incident Issued [CTK] ..... 11  
 Pithart Assures Vranitzky on Temelin Nuclear Plant [Prague Radio] ..... 12

## HUNGARY

Nuclear Energy Agreement Signed With France [MTI] .....	12
---	----

## LATIN AMERICA

### ARGENTINA

Minister Demands 'Truth' on Condor-2 Missile Project [TELAM] .....	13
Sierra Pintada Uranium Complex To Reopen in July [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS] .....	13
Atucha-2 Nuclear Plant To Be Operational by 'Late 1994' [TELAM] .....	13
Minister Announces Condor-2 Demobilization Plans [TELAM] .....	13
Deputy Comments on Chile's 'Lightning' Rocket [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS] .....	14
Plan for Nuclear Dump in Chubut Province Drafted .....	15
Delivery to President Menem [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS] .....	15
Menem Denies Dump in Chubut [CLARIN 6 Jun] .....	15

### BOLIVIA

Government Concerned Over Chilean Rocket Project [Buenos Aires TELAM] .....	15
---	----

### BRAZIL

Nuclear Accord Discussed With Argentina, IAEA [Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS] .....	15
President Collor Visits Navy Nuclear Center [O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO 1 Jun] .....	16

### CUBA

Defector Calls Nuclear Plant 'Technical Disaster' .....	17
Details Poor Quality Control [Madrid EFE] .....	17
Director Insists Facility Safe [Madrid EFE] .....	17
Commentary Outlines Policy on Nuclear Weapons [Havana Radio] .....	17

## NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

### ALGERIA

PRC Denies Helping Manufacture Atomic Bomb [Algiers Radio] .....	19
Minister Denies Intent To Produce Nuclear Weapon [APS] .....	19

### IRAQ

'Official Source' on IAEA Team Visit [INA] .....	19
--	----

### ISRAEL

Ne'eman Says No Plan To Buy Soviet Reactor [Jerusalem Radio] .....	20
Arens Blasts DPRK on Scud Sales to Syria, Iran [KYODO] .....	20
Officials To Study Nuclear Plants in Hungary [Yel Aviv Radio] .....	20

### LEBANON

'Lebanese Forces' Ship Weapons to Border Strip [AL-SAFIR 13 May] .....	20
--	----

### PAKISTAN

Editorial Says U.S. Forcing Adoption of Nuclear Option [NAWA-I-WAQT 1 Feb] .....	21
Editorial Calls for Nuclear Cooperation With Iran [NAWA-I-WAQT 26 Feb] .....	21
Editorial Praises China's Help in Nuclear Development [NAWA-I-WAQT 2 Mar] .....	22
USSR General Staff on Pakistan's Nuclear Arms [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Jun] .....	22
Sharif Proposes Conference on Nuclear Issue .....	23



Cooperation With U.S., USSR, PRC [Islamabad Radio] .....	23
Relations in Region [Islamabad Radio] .....	23

## SOVIET UNION

Bush Chemical Weapons Policy: 'Major Progress' [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 May] .....	24
Pakistani Nuclear Arms Program, U.S. Role Viewed [EKHO PLANETY No 3] .....	24
Nuclear Safety Technology Transfer Expected [TASS] .....	28
Netherlands Proposal To Raise Submarine Accepted [Moscow Radio] .....	28
Country Struggles To Maintain Arms Market Status [IAN PRESS RELEASE] .....	28
Poll Reveals Ambivalence on Nuclear Deterrence [INTERFAX] .....	30
Uranium Processing Agreement Reached [Moscow TV] .....	30
Delegation in France Discusses Nuclear Safety [TASS] .....	30

## WEST EUROPE

### FRANCE

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty To Be Signed .....	32
Proposals Made [AFP] .....	32
Disarmament Plan Outlined [Paris Radio] .....	32
Giscard Comments [Paris Radio] .....	32
Dumas: Signing NPT Does Not Mean Halt to Testing [AFP] .....	33
Matra Moves Ahead on Missiles, Satellites [L'USINE NOUVELLE 25 Apr] .....	33
Arabsat Signs Contract for Satellite Launch [Paris Radio] .....	34
Underground Labs Planned To Study Waste Storage [LE MONDE 16 May] .....	34
Cresson on Initiative for Weapons Destruction [AFP] .....	34
Enriched Uranium Stocks Survived Gulf Bombing [AFP] .....	35
Defense Minister Proposes Reform of Nuclear Force [AFP] .....	35
Nuclear Plant Shut Down for Safety Violations [AFP] .....	36

### GERMANY

Missiles in Former GDR Still 'in Working Order' .....	36
Defense Expert Confirms [ADN] .....	36
Ministry Denies Report [ADN] .....	36
BND: Soviet Chemical, Nuclear Arms Remain [Vienna DIE PRESSE 6 Jun] .....	36
Agreement Signed on Ending Uranium-Ore Mining [ADN] .....	37
Trial Inspection for Chemical Weapons Offered [ADN] .....	37
Reactor To Destroy NATO Ammunition Planned [DPA] .....	37
Nuclear Safety Consortium Established With France [DPA] .....	37
Party Rejects Debate on Nuclear Modernization [DPA] .....	37
No New Nuclear Plants Planned in Eastern Germany [SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 31 May] ...	37
Minister Urges Curbs on Illegal Arms Exports [ADN] .....	38

### NORWAY

India, Romania Heavy Water Investigation Seen [AFTENPOSTEN 7 May] .....	38
---	----

### SPAIN

Ministry Denies Installment of Missile System [OID] .....	39
ENDESA President Fuster Interviewed on Reorganization [CAMBIO 16, 29 Apr] .....	39

## ZAMBIA

### Mibenge Urges South African Nuclear Compliance

MB295183291 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1806 GMT 29 May 91

[Text] Lusaka May 29 SAPA—South Africa must be persuaded by the super powers to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Zambian Foreign Affairs Minister Mr Benjamin Mibenge said in Lusaka on Wednesday [29 May].

Zambia signed the treaty on May 14 and urged the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain to ensure South Africa complied with the treaty.

"If nuclear have-nots like Zambia can accede to the treaty, why can't the nuclear-haves like South Africa be compelled to sign," Mr Mibenge said.

South Africa was capable of producing nuclear weapons and must without "unwarranted equivocation prevarication and subterfuge" be asked to sign the treaty. Pretoria must also submit its nuclear programme before the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The new political climate emerging in South Africa indicated genuine democracy would soon be established, hence the need for the country to comply with international norms, said Mr Mibenge.

**Expert Claims Qinshan Nuclear Plant Safe***HK1305123691 Hong Kong ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE in English 1217 GMT 13 May 91*

["Qinshan Nuclear Plant's Safety Shell Provides Adequate Safety, Says Expert"—ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE headline]

[Excerpt] Beijing, May 13 (HKCNA)—One of the key scientific and technological research items completed during the Seventh Five-Year Plan period showed recently that the Qinshan nuclear power plant, the first of its kind designed and completed solely by China, has maximum threefold accident-bearing capacity, capable of withstanding a strong earthquake measuring 7 on the Richter scale.

The safety shell of this nuclear plant is a hermetically-sealed container housing the entire reactor building as well as the return circuit system. The safety shell has two functions. First, it can stand internal pressure in the event of any accident occurring and restrict radiation from radio-active material from the reactor system from spilling out externally, especially in the serious case of a heavy loss of water. Second, the safety shell can protect the reactor building from damage resulting from an external strike. The safety problem of a nuclear plant's safety shell became a matter of serious concern worldwide after the United States' Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident in 1979 when a heavy loss of water took place.

The Chinese Institute of Architectural Sciences has conducted an analysis of the safety shell's maximum safety-bearing capacity subject to pre-stress force. The institute tested a safety shell model one-tenth the size of the shell at Qinshan, and through tests conducted on the model and theoretical analysis concluded that the Qinshan safety shell is capable of providing sufficient safety. [passage omitted]

**Algeria Denies Plan To Make Nuclear Weapons***OW2605021391 Beijing Central People's Radio Network in Mandarin 1600 GMT 22 May 91*

[Text] Cherif Hadj Slimane, the Algerian ministerial delegate for research and technology, said that Algeria has no intention of making a nuclear bomb, but merely aims to equip itself with nuclear technology for peaceful application.

Commenting on the Western media's reporting of Algeria's plan to make nuclear weapons with the assistance of the Chinese Government, Slimane pointed out that the Peace nuclear reactor built with China's assistance is meant for research purposes only. As its capacity does not exceed 15 megawatts and as it is not capable of producing plutonium, the reactor cannot be used for making nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear Technology Transfer Pact With France Signed***OW2805134291 Beijing XINHUA in English 1426 GMT 28 May 91*

[Text] Beijing, May 28 (XINHUA)—The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation and the French company Framema signed here today a technology transfer agreement involving the design and manufacture of 900,000 kw pressure water reactor nuclear fuel assemblies.

Specialists in China noted that the contract would help the country improve technology related to nuclear fuel assembly design and manufacture for large nuclear power plants.

According to its policy towards the development of nuclear power, China will produce nuclear fuel domestically.

The agreement stipulates that Framema will provide China with the technology and equipment needed to upgrade production at the Yibin Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Factory.

Officials from China National Nuclear Corporation say that the technology will enable the factory to supply fuel assemblies to the Guangdong Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station by the end of 1993.

The French Framatome Corporation, the parent company of Framema, had previously reached an agreement with the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company for the construction of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station.

The agreement signed today is viewed as a further development of Sino-French co-operation in the field of nuclear energy.

**Envoy Refutes Nuclear Allegations***OW0106170891 Beijing XINHUA in English 1648 GMT 1 Jun 91*

[Excerpt] Washington, June 1 (XINHUA)—[passage omitted] Referring to the article by Leslie Gelb on China's export of nuclear technology to Algeria, Chen [Guoqing, press counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Washington] said the heavy-water reactor for research China provided for Algeria is very small, with a designed power of 10 megawatts and maximum thermal power of 15 megawatts.

Chinese-Algerian nuclear cooperation is entirely for peaceful purposes and the reactor "cannot possibly be used to make nuclear weapons," he said.

"To my knowledge, Algeria will brief the agency (International Atomic Energy Agency) on our nuclear cooperation," he said.

In exporting nuclear technology, Chen said, China adheres to the three principles: guarantee for peaceful use, submission to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and supervision and non-transfer to third countries.

"China does not encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation nor help other countries develop nuclear weapons," Chen said.

## JAPAN

### G-7 'Likely' To Agree on Soviet Atomic Aid

OW2805102691 Tokyo KYODO in English 0945 GMT  
28 May 91

[Text] Tokyo, May 28 KYODO—Leaders of seven major industrialized countries are likely to hammer out in the upcoming London summit an agreement to provide the Soviet Union with technical assistance for the management of atomic power plants, Japanese Government sources said Tuesday.

The leaders of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the host nation Britain are considering offering technical cooperation in safety checks on atomic power plants, the sources said.

Cooperation in protection against radiation, observation of the environment, and handling of radioactive waste are also being considered.

The July 15-17 summit is expected to express the participants' support for the Soviet Union for environmental and humanistic reasons, given that accidents at atomic power plants in the Soviet Union will also affect neighboring western countries, the sources said.

Concern over atomic power plant accidents has been strong not only in the Soviet Union but in Eastern Europe since the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, despite Moscow's claim to have carried out safety checks since the accident.

Some East European countries accept Soviet-made plants.

The Tokyo summit in May 1986 called for freer information on the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. This will be the second time the summit has discussed issues concerning Soviet atomic power plants.

The Soviet Union is the world's third largest atomic power plant nation, having 50 operating plants nationwide and an overall output of 38.35 million kilowatts. Among the 50 plants, 16 are of the same type as the one at Chernobyl and there are six others of even older types.

Japan has already made clear that it would provide technical cooperation to the Soviet Union.

During President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit in April, Tokyo and Moscow concluded agreements concerning aid for the people whose health was damaged in the Chernobyl disaster and to ensure that atomic power from Japan-Soviet cooperation is used for peaceful ends.

### Ministers Urge Cooperation at IAEA Meeting

OW0306130791 Tokyo KYODO in English 1240 GMT  
3 Jun 91

[Text] Paris, June 3 KYODO—Members of the International Energy Agency (IAEA) should keep enough oil

stocks while making efforts to diversify energy sources such as nuclear power, in case disruptions to oil supplies like the Persian Gulf war occur, Japanese cabinet members urged Monday at an IAEA meeting.

The calls were made by Japan's International Trade and Industry Minister Eiichi Nakao and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in their respective speeches at the ministerial meeting.

Nakao said as a lesson from the Gulf war, IAEA member countries should work together to stock enough oil in preparation for any future incidents.

Nuclear power is necessary as a means of attaining a stable energy supply, and international cooperation, especially among industrialized nations, is essential to enhance safety of its use and cope with nuclear waste, he added.

Nakayama said Japan will host the Asia-Pacific energy data workshop, which will include non-IAEA countries, at the end of this year in order to promote such cooperation.

He also said IAEA countries need to help East European nations maintain stable energy supplies, in order to continue their economic and political reforms. However, assisting the Soviet Union with energy matters should be made with careful observation on its reforms' progress, Nakayama said.

Both ministers urged the energy issue be considered from a global point of view and the proposed European Energy Charter not be discriminatory and exclusive.

They also pledged Japan will take an active initiative in promoting international cooperation and studies on alternative energy sources.

The IAEA meeting, which opened in Paris on Monday, gathered representatives from its 21 member countries for talks on formulating a world energy policy after the Gulf war.

Promotion of nuclear energy is one expected area of dispute at the meeting. Japan, the United States, Britain, and others are pushing for wider use of nuclear energy, while countries like Sweden and Italy have taken measures to restrict nuclear power generation.

The proposed European Energy Charter is viewed as another disputed issue. The charter has been proposed to secure supplies of crude oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union to European nations by providing economic assistance to the country. Energy resource production has rapidly decreased in what is the world's largest crude oil-producing country.

Whether the charter will include non-European countries like Japan will be a bone of contention, sources at the meeting said.

### Nakayama Proposes Hastening Chemical Weapons Pact

OW0606111691 Tokyo KYODO in English 1036 GMT  
6 Jun 91

[Text] Geneva, June 5 KYODO—Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama on Thursday proposed holding a high-level meeting within the year to expedite negotiations now under way for a chemical weapons prohibition convention. Nakayama, who is in Geneva as part of a two-week swing through the Middle East and Europe, made the remarks in an address before the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.

"I wish to express the hope... that all the states possessing chemical weapons will make announcements admitting the fact," Nakayama told the gathered delegates. Nakayama said it would likewise give impetus to negotiations on a chemical weapons convention if the states with such a capability would announce their intentions to become original signatories to the proposed pact.

Nakayama said the threat of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Persian Gulf war has made it more imperative than ever to hasten the negotiations, which he said are "approaching the final stage."

The Japanese foreign minister welcomed proposals for the conference on disarmament to be convened at the ministerial level, saying, "this may be a way to achieve a breakthrough in some of the pending important issues and to expedite the negotiations." Stressing the need for sufficient groundwork to ensure the success of such a meeting, Nakayama proposed that a meeting of high officials of the various countries concerned be held in Geneva "possibly before the end of this year."

Nakayama welcomed France's recent decision to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and expressed a hope that the move would prompt other nonsignatory states to join the over 140 countries now in the regime. He also said that those states which are NPT signatories, but have yet to conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are strongly urged to do so.

Hinting at a cutoff in aid to countries which fail to heed Japan's advice, Nakayama said, "in extending official development assistance (ODA), the trend in the recipient country of the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles will be taken into account." Japan is especially concerned about North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Nakayama said Japan plans to make "concrete proposals" to the IAEA aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. The proposals are to be presented at the IAEA's board of governors' meeting, which begins June 10 in Vienna. Japan is reported to be proposing that the United Nations Security Council

recommend special inspections when requested to do so by the IAEA, thus making it harder for target countries to refuse.

Nakayama warned that the danger of regional conflicts breaking out may be increasing as East-West confrontation relaxes and as they become less likely to be regarded as proxy conflicts between the two sides. This new situation, he said, underlines the importance of dealing with the proliferation and transfer of all kinds of weapons, including conventional ones.

The foreign minister spoke of the need for enhanced transparency and openness in conventional arms transfers, arrived at through such measures as establishing a registry system in the United Nations. Such a system, he said, would serve the purpose of an early warning to the international community of a dangerous accumulation of conventional weapons in a certain region which upset the military balance and threatened an outbreak of armed conflict.

Nakayama also called on arms-exporting countries to "improve and strengthen their legal and administrative frameworks for the voluntary restriction on exports of conventional weapons."

Nakayama said Japan intends to submit to the next U.N. General Assembly session a draft resolution that would contribute to the establishing of standards and rules, including a reporting system. He proposed that countries sharing the same idea get together and come up with a joint draft resolution.

## NORTH KOREA

### IAEA Reports Pyongyang Ready To Resume Safeguard Talks

OW3005015691 Tokyo KYODO in English 0141 GMT  
30 May 91

[Text] Vienna, May 30 KYODO—North Korea has told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) it is ready to resume talks on a nuclear safeguard treaty, an agency spokesman said Wednesday [30 May]. The move appears to open the way for international inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities, which Pyongyang has previously refused, analysts said.

The agency spokesman said the North Korean permanent observer mission chief to the UN office in Vienna made the indication in a letter to IAEA Director General Hans Blix last Sunday. He said the letter did not refer to nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. forces in South Korea, which Pyongyang has cited in the past as an obstacle to a safeguard treaty.

Pyongyang suspended talks on the safeguard accord last July, when it last had negotiations with the IAEA in Vienna. North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985. Although the treaty obliges a signatory to conclude a safeguard treaty within 18



months, North Korea has dragged out the talks, insisting that it will not accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities until the United States removes nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The IAEA rejected Pyongyang's argument, however, saying the safeguard treaty only stipulates accepting an international nuclear inspection. The IAEA said the issue of U.S. forces' nuclear weapons in South Korea is nothing to do with the negotiations.

The safeguard measure against nuclear weapons through the IAEA is one of the key issues pending in normalization talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang.

Analysts said there is a possibility that North Korea may compromise in the stalled talks on the safeguards following its announcement Tuesday that it will apply for membership of the United Nations, opening the way for the simultaneous entry of both North and South Korea into the world body.

The South Korean Defense Ministry said in April that North Korea has two nuclear reactors and is constructing a facility for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.

#### **Paper Urges Declaring Peninsula Nuclear-Free Zone**

*SK2905073891 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0505 GMT 29 May 91*

[Excerpt] Pyongyang May 29 (KCNA)—Turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear free zone is not only a vital demand of the Korean people but also a unanimous demand of the progressive mankind to live in a peaceful world free from nuclear threat; it is an inseparable, important part of the international anti-nuke and peace movement, says NODONG SINMUN today in a by-lined article.

The article continues:

Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is an inseparable part of the international movement to create nuclear free zones because the Korean peninsula is a zone of the most acute confrontation between nuclear war force and anti-nuke peace force. [passage omitted]

#### **Underground Nuclear Tests Denied**

*SK0106023291 Moscow Radio Moscow  
in Korean 1200 GMT 31 May 91*

[From "Asian News" program under "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK has denied Western reports that it carried out underground nuclear tests. According to special pictures of North Korean territory taken on 30 May by U.S. satellites, the region of the test site showed a sudden increase in surface temperature.

NODONG SINMUN on 31 May carried a commentary regarding these reports, stating that according to DPRK

meteorologists, there was no increase or drop in temperature in the region the United States had indicated as the site for underground nuclear tests.

The commentator also stated that he doubts claims by foreign scientists who say that the unstable temperature is related to underground nuclear tests. He said that the purpose in Western countries' denunciation of the DPRK is to dim the prestige of the Republic and to strengthen their international isolation of the DPRK.

#### **Moscow Commentator on Nuclear Inspection Issue**

*SK0206132691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean  
1100 GMT 1 Jun 91*

[Station commentator (Oleg Alekseyev) on the DPRK's willingness to allow the international team to inspect the nuclear facilities in its territory from the "Focus on Asian" program]

[Text] A dialogue on the nuclear inspection between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has been started recently, at a time a little later than expected. However, it was known that the DPRK was likely to sign a safeguard agreement in July 1990. The dialogue on the agreement, however, was suddenly suspended. Where is the reason for this?

Pyongyang has intended to continue the dialogue, while discussing the issue of withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK. The IAEA had to explain to Pyongyang that the issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the IAEA. Thereby, the talks reached a deadend.

Taking into consideration the DPRK's attitude, moreover, there is suspicion that the DPRK may be in the process of developing its own nuclear weapons. As a result, it seems that the DPRK's international prestige and interest have deteriorated a great deal.

Today's situation is changing. It is, however, not a good time to make a final decision yet. This is because we do not know whether Pyongyang will cancel its political demand that led to a rupture of the talks.

According to the remarks by the majority of observers, the announcement of the DPRK Government may set a prior condition for resuming negotiations with the IAEA.

### **SOUTH KOREA**

#### **DPRK Reportedly To Sign Nuclear Accord**

##### **IAEA Informed**

*SK0806064391 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
8 Jun 91 p 1*

[By correspondent Choe Maeng-ho from Vienna]

[Text] North Korea, which has been under pressure from the international community to sign the nuclear safeguards accord, informed the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on 7 June of its intention to sign the accord.

An IAEA official said: "Chin Chung-kuk, roving ambassador of North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who arrived in Vienna on 7 June in the capacity of the North Korean Government's special envoy, visited Hans Blix, secretary-general of the IAEA, late in the afternoon, to convey North Korea's position as such.

"The North Korean side," according to this source, "went so far as to give a detailed timetable: It would send a negotiation team to the IAEA some time in July to start working negotiations for the purpose of finalizing the words in the agreement that it has been negotiating with the international institution; after the finalization of the agreement, it would be filed to the IAEA Council on 1 September for approval; then North Korea would sign the agreement."

However, nothing is known of North Korea's position on nuclear weapons at the command of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, a reason for which North Korea has refused to sign the nuclear safeguards agreement.

The same IAEA source said: It is my understanding that Ambassador Chin demanded, in exchange for North Korea's signing of the agreement, that the IAEA withdraw its plan to adopt a resolution during its council meeting scheduled for the upcoming October to call on North Korea to sign the agreement.

The resolution in question has been earnestly pushed by a group of countries led by Australia after the ROK Government had called on the IAEA to "take punitive measures against North Korea" at the IAEA's council meeting last February. The number of countries supporting this resolution has increased to 20. Yi Chang-chun, ROK ambassador to Austria and ROK's permanent representative to international institutions in Vienna, is quoted as saying that "an adoption of the resolution seemed certain."

North Korea, even after it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, has postponed signing the nuclear safeguards accord, which stipulates in Article 3 that the signatories to the former sign the latter within 18 months from the day of signing the former.

#### Ministry Urges Unconditional Signing

SK0806102291 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network  
in Korean (0900 GMT 8 Jun 91)

[Text] Commenting on North Korea's announcement on its plan to sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord today, a Foreign Ministry official said that South Korea will watch North Korea until it signs the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, calling on North Korea to immediately sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, a duty it is required to fulfill as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The government official said: In particular, North Korea's insistence on changing some words in the standard agreement and on holding a meeting of specialists with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] is a breach of norms which makes people wonder whether it is really interested in signing the nuclear safeguard agreement or not.

This official said: However, given the norms that signatories to the Nuclear Safeguards Accord accept the words in the standard agreement without conditions the possibility cannot be ruled out that North Korea's statement that it would sign the accord during the regular session of the IAEA in September after holding a meeting of specialists next month may be a remedy designed to block the adoption of the resolution calling on North Korea to sign the accord, which is considered to be certainly adopted at the IAEA council meeting scheduled for 10 June.

#### Report on Temperatures of North Nuclear Site Disputed

SK1705010091 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
17 May 91 p 3

[Text] The ground temperature in Yongbyon, North Korea, where nuclear reprocessing facilities are located, shot up briefly at around 3 a.m. Tuesday, the Science-Technology Ministry said yesterday.

The Ministry said it was notified by the National Fisheries Research and Development Agency (NFRDA) that at that time the temperature around the Yongbyon area, 96 km north of Pyongyang, abnormally went up to 35 degrees C from the normal temperature of 10-15 degrees C.

The NFRDA, an affiliate of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry, received the data from an earth observation satellite of the U.S. National Ocean and Atmosphere Administration (NOAA). The NOAA satellite circles the earth every 110 minutes and transmits data to stations across the globe.

The information immediately fuelled suspicion that North Korea, which has refused to place its nuclear facilities under international safeguard inspection, might have conducted an underground test of a nuclear explosive device, driving up the temperature in the Yongbyon area.

Another theory is that there might have been a nuclear accident.

The Ministry immediately ordered environmental radioactivity monitoring offices in eight provinces to measure and analyze possible fallout, floating particles, rain, potable water and the atmospheric radioactivity rate, only to find that there was nothing abnormal with them.

The Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) also said it was not aware of any abrupt temperature change in the Yongbyon area at that time. The weather office

receives meteorological data from 20 regions in North Korea every three hours under an international meteorological data exchange accord.

"According to the data we received at that time, the temperatures in the Yongbyon area were 10-15 degrees C," said a KMA official at the satellite department. "We did not find anything abnormal."

The weatherman added, "Perhaps there was an error in the satellite transmission or monitoring systems and computer programs at the NFRDA."

#### **DPRK Scholar's Views on Inspection Reported**

SK2005020991 Seoul YONHAP in English 0151 GMT  
20 May 91

[Text] Washington, May 19 (YONHAP)—North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1985 to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, but the threat from atomic weapons held by foreign forces in South Korea remains, a North Korean economist said at a seminar over the weekend.

Prof. Kim Su-yong, chief of the Economics Department of Kim Il-song University in Pyongyang, said North Korea was not the only country that refused to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards accord. An NPT signatory is obliged to sign the accord within 18 months, but North Korea refuses and is thought to be within a few years of producing an atomic bomb.

"More than 50 NPT signatories refuse to allow international inspection (of their nuclear facilities)," Kim told South Korean reporters following a two-day seminar May 17-18 in Washington on Asia and the Pacific sponsored by George Washington University's Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies.

Kim said North Korea would sign the safeguards accord at some time in the future and open its nuclear facilities to international inspection, but he did not say when.

America has talked of improving relations with North Korea "but the U.S. attitude remains cool and the wall is high," he said.

Both Washington and Tokyo are discussing improvement of ties with Pyongyang, but North Korea's refusal to open its nuclear facilities is one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the talks.

Kim denied North Korea was economically closed or isolated, saying talks were going on over a tripartite economic bloc linking North Korea, China's Shandong Province and Siberia.

The seminar was attended by scholars from 10 countries, including South Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, Vietnam and Mongolia.

#### **DPRK Reportedly To Build New Scud Missile**

SK0306034291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0258 GMT  
3 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 3 (YONHAP)—North Korea has secretly signed a contract with Libya on building a new type of Scud missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers, a highly-placed South Korean military source said Monday. Libya will bankroll the costly project on condition that the Scuds and related technology would be given to Tripoli, the source said. North Korea already produces a version of the Soviet Scud-B with a 600-km range.

"North Korea can strike any target in South Korea with the existing 600-km Scuds, which are deployed near the truce line bordering the two Koreas. The new missiles will be an even more serious threat to security in South Korea," the source said.

South Korea lags behind North Korea in terms of missile development as it is under constant U.S. pressure not to build missiles with a range of over 200 kilometers, according to the source. The North Korean Scuds are reportedly capable of carrying nuclear or chemical warheads.

Denying reports that North Korea has already completed the much touted nuclear facilities, the source said the facilities would be finished by the end of 1993 at the latest and would produce nuclear bombs from 1995. He added, however, that there was a possibility North Korea would complete the work by the end of this year and start building weapons from 1993.

Amid widespread reports that North Korea is only a few years away from producing nuclear devices, many nations have called on the communist leadership to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection, but to no avail.

North Korean President Kim Il-song told a visiting group of Japanese journalists on Saturday that inspection should be made of both South Korea and North Korea. "Inspection should be made simultaneously, not only on our side, which does not have nuclear weapons, but in South Korea, which has them," Kim was quoted as telling officials of KYODO NEWS SERVICE over lunch.

North Korea consistently says the U.S. forces in South Korea possess nuclear arms. The U.S. Administration follows a policy of neither denying nor confirming the presence of nuclear weapons.

According to earlier reports, North Korea is capable of producing more than 50 surface-to-surface Scud-B missiles a year with a range of 300 kilometers and has at least 12 launchers near the truce line. There are another 12 mobile launchers 40 to 50 kilometers north of the Demilitarized Zone.



North Korea has reportedly deployed approximately 30 SA-5 surface-to-air missiles with a 300-km range purchased from the Soviet Union, and can produce more than 100 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles with a 5-km range every year.

Production lines for surface-to-surface missiles were built in the vicinity of Pyongyang in 1987 and turn out more than 50 Scud-B's a year. Pyongyang began test firings in 1984 and modified the Scud-B's in 1988 to double the range to 600km.

### Editorial Calls for Nuclear-Free Zone on Peninsula

SK0306072291 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
3 Jun 91 p 3

[Editorial: "North's Nuclear Development Should Be Stopped"]

[Text] Rarely have our people entered such a dangerous phase as now. By dangerous phase, we mean the nuclear issue. Since 6 August 1945, the day an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, mankind has maintained that never again must the atomic bomb be used. Despite this antinuclear argument, nuclear bombs have continued to increase in both quality and quantity.

The United States and the Soviet Union have manufactured nuclear weapons on the excuse of providing mutual deterrence while France, China, and India did the same largely driven by national self-respect. Nowhere has there been any deterrence to the nuclear proliferation by these countries. Although the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have continued negotiations designed to control nuclear weapons since the fifties, nuclear proliferation has never stopped.

Luckily, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was signed in 1968. However, France, China, Israel, and South Africa did not sign the treaty on grounds of national security. Later, Korea once assumed nuclear development as its national goal for the purpose of providing national security, but had to give up in the face of international pressure.

North Korea is now trying to join the ranks of nuclear powers. In particular, when former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze made a visit to Pyongyang last September, Kim Yong-nam, North Korea's vice premier and foreign minister, was reported to have said that North Korea would embark upon nuclear development on its own should South Korea and the Soviet Union normalize their diplomatic relations.

Few believed that North Korea meant what it said. With many saying this and that about North Korea's declaration, the Japanese daily SANKEI SHIMBUN, quoting U.S. intelligence sources, said the other day that North Korea has already completed nuclear reprocessing facilities which enables it to manufacture nuclear bombs and

that the United States had strongly demanded that North Korea stop its construction.

We hope these reports are not true. If, however, they turn out to be true, things are more serious than expected. Some other reports say that North Korea, following its declaration that it would apply for a UN seat, is likely to allow a nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This notwithstanding, the two nuclear reactors of different sizes in Yongbyon and nuclear reprocessing facilities now in construction weigh heavy on our minds.

Mankind, after making the mistake of having produced and put to practical use nuclear bombs, has made every effort possible not to repeat the same mistake, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, reduction and banning of nuclear tests, and the abolition of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces and have attained some minor successes. Since a complete abolition of nuclear weapons is hard to achieve, we can only hope for the creation of nuclear-free zones in regions. The ROK and the United States need to make a first move to keep North Korea from developing its own nuclear weapons on its own, not by way of a preemptive strike, but by way of declaring a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

### Editorial Urges 'Pressure' on North Over Nuclear Accord

SK0706020091 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
7 Jun 91 p 6

[Editorial: "NK's [North Korea's] Nuclear Facilities"]

[Text] Following North Korea's abrupt announcement of its decision to enter the United Nations, the next vital question that pops up is whether the North will allow the international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Linking the reported Pyongyang policy change to future developments, Guido De Marco, president of the U.N. General Assembly, opined during his recent visit here that if Pyongyang joined the world forum, it would become more responsive to the issue of international surveillance of its nuclear facilities.

In fact, many nations including the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan have expressed concern that North Korea might be developing nuclear weapons, since the North has refused to sign a mandatory nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] for inspection of its nuclear facilities, even though this is required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which it is a signatory.

Reports from Tokyo disclosed that North Korea is running a 30-megawatt atomic reactor and has obtained enough spent nuclear fuel containing plutonium to produce a nuclear bomb. The North reportedly is also building a 200-megawatt reactor and a reprocessing plant at the same site in Yongbyon, some 50 miles north of Pyongyang. It is feared that if the North's nuclear

development proceeds at the present pace, it will be capable of producing nuclear warheads for missiles in several years.

Expressing grave concern over this dismal development, the United States is reported to have demanded that North Korea not only accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities but also halt construction of a reprocessing plant and destroy the recycling facilities.

The North Korea regime has categorically denied its development of nuclear weapons, accusing the U.S. of fabricating stories to whip up anti-Pyongyang hysteria. North Korean leader Kim Il-song asserted in a recent press interview that his country has no nuclear weapons and is not producing them. At the same time, he significantly stated that he would open up nuclear facilities to international inspection after reaching an agreement with the United States.

Kim's remarks are seen revealing an intention to use the inspection issue as a bait for improving relations with the United States, which he said will help resolve the difficult problems standing in the way of normalization talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo. This North Korean attitude indicates the bizarreness of its attempt to step out of its self-imposed isolation for its political and economic survival.

In a positive maneuver, Pyongyang has proposed to Hans Blix, IAEA secretary-general, that it is ready to reopen negotiations that could lead to a safeguards agreement. No doubt, the Pyongyang overture is a forward-looking step, yet its implications are uncertain.

Our hope is that the isolated country has taken a really constructive though reluctant initiative to become a viable member of the international community with its admission into the United Nations and the acceptance of the international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Nonetheless, there is still lingering skepticism as to whether Pyongyang really intends to allow the nuclear inspection and whether it is not craftily attempting to buy time in order to head off criticism when the IAEA's board of directors meets next week.

North Korea has so far borne the brunt of growing international criticism for its refusal of comprehensive inspections with an unreasonable demand for the U.S. evacuation of its alleged nuclear arsenal from South Korea. In the meantime, the Soviet Union, its traditional ally, has prodded the North to comply with the inspection and Japan has made it a requirement for normalization of Tokyo-Pyongyang relations.

In this delicate situation, more international pressure on the Pyongyang regime is necessary to bring the North to the party. Hopefully, the forthcoming IAEA board meeting will provide momentum, as Japan and leading members will reportedly sponsor a resolution calling for Pyongyang's compliance with the international nuclear inspections.

### Ministry Denies DPRK-Libya Scud Contract

SK0706103191 Seoul YONHAP in English 1002 GMT  
7 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 7 (OANA-YONHAP)—The South Korean Defense Ministry on Friday categorically denied ever suggesting that Libya has a contract with North Korea on building a new type of Scud missile of 1,000 km range.

An official statement claimed the Ministry has never said there was such a contract and added South Korea does not believe that Libya will seek military cooperation with North Korea.

A military source here was reported earlier this week as having said that North Korea and Libya has an agreement, by which Tripoli would finance the missile development on condition that Pyongyang transfer the Scuds and related technology.

"The Defense Ministry, on recent press reports about North Korea-Libya 1,000 km-range Scud missile development, completely denies that it ever made such remarks," the statement said.

"South Korea values highly its economic cooperation with Libya and hopes such ties will continue in the future," the statement said, "and we do not anticipate that Libya will pursue military cooperation with North Korea."

Meanwhile, a well-placed government source on Friday said Libya on number of occasions confirmed South Korea that it has no intention of pursuing military tieups with North Korea. [sentence as received]

"The South Korean Government has no knowledge of any military cooperation between Pyongyang and Tripoli," he said.

"Libya has confirmed on number of occasions that it has never sought such ties and has no intention of doing so in the future," he said.

Pyongyang has recently emerged as a serious international nuclear threat, reportedly building facilities that can produce nuclear bombs as early as 1995.

North Korea is said to be already capable of producing 600 km Scud-b missiles and own launchers that can carry both nuclear and chemical warheads.

### Study Commissioned on Nuclear Waste Site

SK0706083191 Seoul YONHAP in English 0734 GMT  
7 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 7 (YONHAP)—Since no region has volunteered to be host to a nuclear waste dump, the government has commissioned a study and will designate a site by the end of the year.

And plans to build the second atomic energy institute and a nuclear waste treatment plant on Anmyon Island

off the west coast have been formally scrapped Friday, a spokesman for the Science and Technology Ministry said.

The study will be done by Seoul National University and the Korea Institute of Energy and Resources, and based on their recommendations the government will select possible sites and hold public hearings on them before announcing its choice.

To sweeten the pie and win local cooperation, a blueprint for regional development will be drawn up for the area picked as home to nuclear waste, the spokesman said. Work would begin in 1992, he said.

In 1990, the people of Anmyon rose up in protest against plans to build the radioactive waste storage facility on their island and the government had to shelve the project. Science and Technology Minister Chung Kun-mo resigned, taking responsibility for the imbroglio.

The decision was made during a meeting of the Atomic Energy Committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Choe Kak-kyu. Science and Technology Minister Kim Chin-hyun, Energy and Resources Minister Chin Nyom and Senior Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs Kim Chong-in were present.

#### Official Disputes U.S. Paper's Report on Nuclear Weapons

SK1006123691 Seoul YONHAP in English 1218 GMT 10 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 10 (OANA-YONHAP)—A senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official on Monday denied as "unfounded" a U.S.-based report that the United States considers removal of its nuclear warheads from South Korea and that it is consulting with the Seoul government about doing so.

"Our government has never been consulted with regard to the matter," the official said.

According to a Sunday issue of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, Washington is considering the matter with a view to persuading North Korea to give up nuclear armament.

As for any connection between the nuclear matter on the Korean peninsula and North Korea's signing of an accord allowing international inspection of its nuclear facilities, the official said that the two things are "quite separate issues."

"It is our government's consistent position that the question of nuclear (arms) on the Korean peninsula should be dealt with separately from that of North Korea's liability as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)," he said.

North Korea said Friday that it would sign the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

#### South To Seek Resolution on Inspecting North

SK1006031491 Seoul YONHAP in English 0251 GMT 10 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 10 (YONHAP)—South Korea, despite North Korea's pledge to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA's] nuclear safeguards accord, will seek an IAEA resolution calling for inspections of nuclear facilities in North Korea, South Korean officials said Monday.

"There remain some problems that make it hard to trust North Korea and our opinion is shared by such Western countries as the United States and Japan. We will make further diplomatic efforts at the IAEA Board of Governors' meeting opening in Vienna on Monday to adopt a resolution pressing North Korea to accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities immediately," one of the officials said.

There was no sign North Korea had changed its attitude regarding the question of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, he said. A change in South Korea-U.S. nuclear policy could be considered or discussed only after North Korean nuclear facilities had been inspected and North Korea's inability and lack of intent to develop nuclear weapons confirmed.

The LOS ANGELES TIMES reported Sunday that the United States was weighing the possibility of removing nuclear warheads from South Korea as part of a concerted effort to get North Korea to halt the continuing development of its own nuclear weapons.

The paper said withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea would alter a longstanding and sacrosanct element of U.S. security policy in Asia.

When North Korea notified the IAEA it would soon sign the safeguards accord Friday, it did not set its long-standing condition of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and withdrawal of nuclear arms from South Korea, but it is expected to raise the issue in the course of negotiations with the IAEA, the official said.

North Korean roving ambassador Chin Chung-kuk visited IAEA Director-General Hans Blix at the Agency's Vienna headquarters Friday and said his country hoped to discuss details of the accord with the Agency in mid-July.

Chin reportedly said North Korea would sign the accord as soon as a draft was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, meeting in September, the Foreign Ministry said.

The fact that the notification came just days before the IAEA governors' meeting and that the negotiation dates were set for July could mean that Pyongyang hopes to momentarily escape international pressure to sign the safeguards accord, South Korean officials said.

Recent reports say North Korea is building a facility in Yongbyon, some 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang, that will be able [to] produce atomic bombs from as early as 1993.

Pyongyang joined the IAEA Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 1985 but has yet to sign the safeguards accord.

## BULGARIA

### Kozloduy's Sixth Reactor Reactivated

AU2905161991 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network  
in Bulgarian 1450 GMT 29 May 91

[Veselin Angelov reports]

[Text] Today the chain reaction of the 1,000 megawatt sixth reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant was reactivated. For the time being the reactor will function at the minimum capacity level. This will be the first stage of its full reactivation. Several physical experiments will be conducted within 10 days to check the protection systems. Afterward, the reactor's capacity will be gradually increased, until it is fully connected with the country's energy system.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Radioactive Spill at Jaslovské Bohunice Plant

#### IAEA Rates as 3d Degree Incident

LD1705171491 Prague CTK in English 1639 GMT  
17 May 91

[Text] Prague May 17 (CTK)—On May 12, 100 litres of a potassium chromate/potassium dichromate solution leaked onto the floor of the reactor hall in the A1 nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bohunice, West Slovakia, the Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Commission (CSKAE) told CTK today.

The Jaslovské Bohunice plant has been shut down since 1977.

The commission's nuclear safety inspector said the incident took place as the result of a mistake made by plant personnel while draining a tank filled with the radioactive solution.

The incident was classified as third degree on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Ines scale of zero to seven. In IAEA terminology, degrees one to three are designated as "incidents" while four to seven is considered an "accident". Czechoslovakia is required to announce publicly all incidents of second degree and up.

None of the personnel on-duty were radiated during the incident, and no radioactive material leaked out of the plant building. The cause of the incident is being investigated by the CSKAE's nuclear security inspector.

#### Report on Incident Issued

AU2805110891 Prague CTK in English 1703 GMT  
23 May 91

[Text] Bratislava May 23 (CTK)—The Jaslovské Bohunice nuclear power plant in West Slovakia will use from now onward the International Atomic Energy Agency's INES scale in classifying the degree of radiation in case

of incident, says a report of the Jaslovské Bohunice Nuclear Plant Information Center, handed over to CTK today.

The report refers to the leakage of 50 liters of a potassium chromate/potassium dichromate solution onto the floor of the reactor hall in the A1 nuclear power plant at Jaslovské Bohunice on May 12 and announced on May 17.

According to regulations so far valid in the power plant, the incident was classified as a first-degree one which did not require immediate reporting to the Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Commission.

According to the INES scale of zero to seven, the accident was classified as third degree and Czechoslovakia promised to report all incidents of second degree and up.

Prague—None of the personnel on-duty were radiated during the incident in the Jaslovské Bohunice nuclear power plant on May 12, and no radioactive material leaked out of the plant building, according to a report submitted to the Czechoslovak Government and handed over to CTK today.

The report, delivered by the Federal Committee for Environment Chairman Josef Vavroušek and the Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Commission Chairman Karel Wagner, said there is no danger of further leakage during works on eliminating the consequences of the accident. Nevertheless, the vicinity of the reactor hall in which the accident took place is strongly contaminated.

The accident took place as the result of violation of technological regulations by the personnel, the report said.

Though there were no casualties and the accident will certainly have no consequences, the May 12 accident was the most extensive indoor leakage of radioactive material in the history of Czechoslovak nuclear power plants, the report said.

On May 16, the Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Agency's inspection group arrived on the site of the accident and immediately sent a report to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and to responsible authorities in Austria, Germany, and Hungary, the report said.

The investigation has not yet been concluded. The Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Commission has fined the nuclear plant for failing to report on the accident in time and will demand punishment of those who broke regulations.

**Pithart Assures Vranitzky on Temelin Nuclear Plant**

*LD2705172691 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 27 May 91*

[Excerpt] Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart met in Prague today Austrian Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. He assured the guest that the nuclear power plant in Temelin will not be built according to original plans and, in addition, it will be protected by state-of-the-art safety equipment. [passage omitted]

**HUNGARY****Nuclear Energy Agreement Signed With France**

*LD2905133491 Budapest MTI in English 1159 GMT 29 May 91*

[Text] Paris, May 29 (MTI)—An agreement on the expansion of Hungarian-French co-operation over the utilization

of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has been signed in Paris by Dr. Erno Pungor, minister without portfolio, chairman of the Nuclear Energy Committee and of the State Office for Technical Development. Under it, co-operation will be extended to the development of security technology for nuclear power plants.

Erno Pungor and his host, Hubert Curien, minister of research and technology, agreed the co-operation in scientific research should be concentrated on concrete schemes to be defined shortly in Budapest.

Pungor held talks about Hungary's participation in EC's Eureka programme, and the French partner pledged support for Hungary's efforts towards increased involvement in the project.



## ARGENTINA

### Minister Demands 'Truth' on Condor-2 Missile Project

PY1805172491 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish  
2134 GMT 17 May 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 17 May (TELAM)—Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo said today that Argentina "needs to know 100 percent of the truth" about the nature of the project to develop the "Condor-2" missile. He added that the Foreign Ministry "has not authorized the sale of any missile technology abroad."

Cavallo told former Air Force Commander Brigadier Julio Crespo: "From the viewpoint of my own economic and logical analysis, I cannot understand why a country should supply the Argentine Air Force with funds to develop a missile without the Air Force—or Argentina as a nation—committing itself to transferring that technology."

He said this is "the first point that makes me realize there has been an illegal situation, a commitment to export technology without the participation of the Argentine Foreign Ministry and the Economy Ministry, as is established by law."

Cavallo recalled that while at the Foreign Ministry he did not find any document signed by former Foreign Minister Dante Caputo or the former Foreign Ministry under secretary authorizing the transfer of Condor fuel technology to another country. He said the document would also have to be signed by former Economic Coordination Under Secretary Adolfo Canitrot.

In a telephone interview aired today on a radio program conducted by Bernardo Neustadt, Cavallo told Crespo: "I do not know whether the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Economy issued a secret resolution—of which no document was left at the Foreign Ministry—or whether it was a violation of the law establishing the two ministries' control of the sale of weapons abroad."

### Sierra Pintada Uranium Complex To Reopen in July

PY2005022491 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS  
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1853 GMT 18 May 91

[Text] Mendoza, 18 May (NA)—The Sierra Pintada mining complex, the primary Argentine uranium reserve, will resume activities in July. Uranium concentration to obtain pellets to fuel nuclear reactors will also take place there.

This report was released by Carlos Guillermo Martin, head of the mining complex, during a lecture at the plant, which is in the 25 de Mayo District, San Rafael Department, 240 km south of Mendoza. Martin noted that Sierra Pintada has been inactive for some time due to restrictive budget measures adopted by the National

Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and due to the stock of processed uranium ore.

When the plant resumes activities in July, it will again produce an ore containing between 800 and 900 grams of uranium per metric ton. After the concentration process, the ratio is 700 kg of uranium per metric ton.

Previously, the uranium concentration took place in Cordoba and its target was the nuclear plants of Atucha 1, Embalse de Rio Tercero, and Atucha 2, which is under construction.

Martin added that there are 185 people working in Sierra Pintada, although this figure could rise to 300, including contractors and security agents.

### Atucha-2 Nuclear Plant To Be Operational by 'Late 1994'

PY2105001691 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish  
1850 GMT 19 May 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 19 May (TELAM)—With the agreement on the recent loans between Argentina and Germany—part of the 200 million francs [as received] has already begun to arrive—82 percent of work on the Atucha-2 nuclear power plant will be completed by late 1992. At this moment, 60 percent of the work has been completed and the plant will be operational by late 1994.

The heavy water plant in Arroyito, Neuquen Province, will begin to produce heavy water by late 1992 and it is estimated that, after the Atucha-2 plant becomes operational, the Arroyito plant will have enough heavy water stored for operation of the Atucha-2 plant.

What should be done with the nuclear waste is an issue that has always been viewed as a problem by the champions of nuclear power as a source for electrical energy. CNEA [National Commission for Atomic Energy] President Manuel Mondino recalled that the ecological organization Greenpeace is opposed to construction of a nuclear waste dump in Patagonia.

Mondino admitted that "at this moment," the CNEA is "not" considering construction of such a site. He added: "Nevertheless, we must be prepared and we are in a position to handle small quantities of nuclear waste." Mondino emphasized: "The chemical waste thrown into rivers is much more contaminative."

### Minister Announces Condor-2 Demobilization Plans

PY2805154691 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish  
1456 GMT 28 May 91

[Excerpts] Buenos Aires, 28 May (TELAM)—Defense Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez stated today that the message he will deliver to the population tonight will be "a political answer to the concerns that have been expressed by the community" on such fundamental

topics as the military budget, the role of the Armed Forces, and the issue of the Condor-2 missile. [passage omitted]

In response to a question on the deactivation of the Condor-2 program, he announced that "as of July, draftees from the class of 1971 will begin to be demobilized." He stated that in July, 50 percent of the draftees will be demobilized, "while the other 50 percent of the class will be demobilized at the beginning of November 1991."

### Deputy Comments on Chile's 'Lightning' Rocket

PY3105173491 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS

ARGENTINAS in Spanish 0012 GMT 31 May 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 30 May (NA)—The "Lightning" rocket developed by the Chilean Armed Forces and unveiled only 48 hours after the announcement of the Argentine decision to dismantle the Condor-2 project, is not a missile but an artillery rocket with a range of 40 km. It can be used to provide "zone saturation capability, and Argentina has nothing comparable to this rocket."

This report was released today by the Center of Studies for the New Majority [Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoria—CENM]. The report also notes that the rocket "is a tactical weapon system designed for land battle" because it does not have a "self-guidance system."

Horacio Jaunarena, former defense minister under the Radical Civic Union [UCR] government, has stated that "it makes no sense to give up" Argentina's Condor-2 missile project "when Chile, Brazil, and other countries are still increasing their work on this type of project."

He added that the dismantling of the Condor-2 project means that the country "has given up the idea of developing autonomous technology and has decided to be dependent in that area. This will prevent Argentina from achieving its own satellite delivery systems and will subordinate it to the dictates of other countries."

UCR Deputy Conrado Storani, a member of the Chamber of Deputies Defense Committee, has stated that the Chilean initiative "upsets the balance of military power between the two countries."

Storani also objected to the deactivation of the Condor-2 missile, saying that it means that the "Argentine Government has clearly given in to U.S. pressure." He added that the dismantling of the Argentine missile is indicative of "the degree of submission we have reached in our bilateral relations." He also questioned the fact that the Chilean project was developed "without the U.S. pressure directed against the Condor-2 project."

Storani added that the Chilean rocket "should worry" Argentina, "especially now that the Condor-2 project has been dismantled."

He said the Condor-2 and the Lightning rocket "had been discussed" among Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez and "several congressmen" but that during the meeting the defense minister "did not respond to the concerns expressed to him, limiting himself to promising to meet with the Defense Committee next week. [no closing quotation mark as received]

Storani also deplored the fact that the dismantling of the Condor-2 included "the elimination of the project plans." He added that German, French, and Italian enterprises participated in the project.

Commenting on the fact that in 1989 a U.S. Congress defense committee [not further identified] termed the Condor-2 "a dangerous and destabilizing factor" for Latin America, he criticized the fact that Chile has not received "any kind of threat of economic sanctions" from the United States due to its development of the Lightning rocket.

The CENM has reported that the Lightning rocket "is not a missile nor a strategic weapon, but a free rocket or tactical weapon system to be used in land battle," because "it does not have a self-guidance system."

"It cannot be guided to hit a given target. It is a weapon that is aimed in the general direction of an area. Usually several rockets are fired to ensure that the target is hit; the more shots fired, the greater the possibility of saturating the targeted area," the report notes.

Nevertheless, the report warns that the rocket could have "a substantial land coverage capability" if it is equipped with cluster bombs similar to those used by the United States in the war against Iraq.

The report adds that a missile launcher usually carries between one and eight missiles, while free rocket launcher systems have at least 12 and, in some cases, up to 48 launch tubes.

The report also reveals that Argentina "has manufactured a small number of 105-mm 'Pampero' and 127-mm 'SAPBA' [self-propelled ballistic rocket system] 'self-propelled multiple rocket launcher systems' (SLAM), which are mounted on trucks."

It adds that there is still a prototype of a TAM [Argentine Medium Tank] chassis carrying a multiple rocket launcher system with a range of 40 km at the TAMSE [Medium Argentine Tank Factory, State Enterprise] military factory in the Boulogne area of Buenos Aires.

The report also notes that the only Latin American rocket launcher system that has been used in combat is the Argentine-made "Yarara," with 42 tubes and a maximum range of 11 km. The Argentine rocket launchers were used in southern Nicaragua in 1979.

## **Plan for Nuclear Dump in Chubut Province Drafted**

### **Delivery to President Menem**

PY0306171691 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS  
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1724 GMT 2 Jun 91

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 2 Jun (NA)—According to a Buenos Aires daily, in a few days high-ranking officials from the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) will deliver to President Carlos Menem and other government officials a draft proposal to build and operate "a storage facility for highly radioactive waste," also known as a nuclear dump, in Chubut Province.

The newspaper reported that "the feasibility study and the architectural design" are ready. The nuclear waste dump will be built in Gastre, in a mountain range 400 km west of Puerto Madryn.

The draft, prepared by top CNEA officials, states that it is necessary to build this facility in Chubut "to close the nuclear fuel cycle."

Scientifically speaking, the "nuclear waste dump," also known as "geological medium system engineering barrier-highly radioactive waste container" [sistema medio geologico-barrera de ingenieria-contenedor de residuos de alta actividad], is designed to isolate nuclear waste produced by the operation of nuclear power plants using radioactive fuel such as uranium.

The CNEA officials sponsoring the project, including Elias Palacios, CNEA manager for radiological and nuclear safety, have explained that the country is "already producing nuclear waste" for which "we must find lasting solutions."

The draft, which emphasizes the "feasibility" of the nuclear waste dump, may be submitted to President Carlos Menem, Vice President Eduardo Duhalde, Chamber of Deputies Chairman Alberto Pierri, and Chubut Province Governor Fernando Cosentino. [passage omitted]

### **Menem Denies Dump in Chubut**

PY0706223691 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish  
6 Jun 91 p 32

[Excerpt] President Carlos Menem has stated that no nuclear waste dump will be installed in Gastre, Chubut Province. Menem added, however, that due to Argentina's development in the nuclear field, "we must start looking for a place to dump nuclear waste." Menem made these remarks before releasing his World Environment Day message to the nation over a radio and television network. [passage omitted]

## **BOLIVIA**

### **Government Concerned Over Chilean Rocket Project**

PY0306151091 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish  
0237 GMT 3 Jun 91

[Text] La Paz, 2 Jun (TELAM-EFE)—The Bolivian Government today expressed its concern over Chile's plans to manufacture the new "Lightning" rocket because the weapon will create a military imbalance in the region and because it works against the peace processes under way in Latin America.

"Bolivians do not understand this urge to engage in a senseless arms race because all Latin American countries are involved in the peace process," Bolivian National Defense Minister Hector Ormachea has said.

On 29 May, a source in Santiago announced the construction—with the support of a British enterprise—of the 160-mm "Lightning" surface-to-surface rocket with a range of 40 km. The weapon could possibly be guided remotely.

The Bolivian minister noted that he did not understand "why Chile wants to build expensive weapons just as world tension is easing and peace among nations is being promoted." He added: "The new missile will create a military imbalance and could cause increased military spending in the region, which will use up funds that should be dedicated to the health, education, and transportation sectors."

Bolivia and Chile broke diplomatic relations in 1978 after failing to settle a border dispute pending since Bolivia lost its Pacific coastline territory in a war in which it fought with Peru against Chile.

## **BRAZIL**

### **Nuclear Accord Discussed With Argentina, IAEA**

PY2405035491 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS  
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 0300 GMT 22 May 91

[All quotation marks as received]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro, 21 May (AFP-NA)—Today in Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian, Argentine, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) representatives began negotiations on a safeguards agreement for the nuclear material produced by the two countries.

Speaking to journalists, Jose Luiz Santana de Carvalho, president of the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN), said that about 30 articles of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA are being discussed in the meeting that will conclude on 22 May in Rio de Janeiro.



Carvalho added that this agreement excludes from the IAEA safeguards autonomous nuclear technology, basically the military technology developed by Brazil and the technology developed by Argentina.

Carvalho also noted that representatives of the two countries will meet again in June 1991 at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna and that subsequently the agreement will be submitted for the approval of the congresses of the two countries.

Carvalho said that the decision to formalize this agreement was made in November 1990 by Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello and Argentine President Carlos Menem.

Carvalho also noted that Brazil and Argentina "are informed of the production in their respective nuclear areas and now we are discussing the political side of the agreement."

Carvalho added that the two countries will sign a bilateral agreement on inspection of their respective nuclear facilities. He emphasized: "We will establish limits for such inspection without giving up the technology that we have already achieved."

Concerning the agreement with the IAEA, Carvalho said that this agency does not impose a pattern of inspection, but recommends one."

Carvalho said that Brazil and Argentina will establish the limits for such inspection. He added that his country "will not subject to inspection by Argentina or the IAEA Brazilian technology to produce enriched uranium by ultracentrifugation at the Navy Ministry's Aramar Center in Ipero, Sao Paulo State.

Carvalho indicated that neither will Brazil permit Argentina to inspect facilities where Brazil is developing technology to enrich uranium with lasers at the Aeronautics Ministry's laboratories in Sao Jose dos Campos, Sao Paulo State, and that Argentina will not permit inspection of the Argentine uranium enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu, near San Carlos de Bariloche.

Brazil and Argentina signed their first bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation in May 1980, after the two countries reached an agreement on the hydroelectric use of the Parana River.

#### **President Collor Visits Navy Nuclear Center**

*PY0506003991 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 1 Jun 91 p 4*

[Excerpt] Ipero—On 31 May, President Fernando Collor visited the Aramar Experimental Center in Ipero, in the interior of Sao Paulo State, where the Navy is developing a program to enrich the uranium that will be used in the Brazilian nuclear submarine project. Collor avoided voicing an opinion on the project during his visit that lasted one hour and 45 minutes. He carefully listened to

the explanations given by Admiral Othon Pinheiro da Silva, Aramar Experimental Center coordinator, who also made an indirect request for support. The admiral emphasized: "Popular support, a clear purpose, and the nation's determination are required if this type of project is to succeed." Collor nodded in agreement and said that the government "will evaluate" the program.

Collor then went to the uranium enrichment laboratory where the ultracentrifuges are installed. Before entering the laboratory, Collor put on special protective clothing, gloves, and protective overshoes. As he left, he walked through a machine that monitored his whole body to make sure that he had not been contaminated with uranium. Collor visited part of the 852-hectare property that houses the experimental center. He used the opportunity to become acquainted with the grain project, which involves a huge plantation of beans, rice, and oats, as well as various types of vegetables. According to a technical report, this project seeks to demonstrate to the population that the center does not pose a contamination threat.

During his 15-minute address, the admiral reported that about \$402 million have already been invested in the project since it began in 1980. Of this total, 85 percent has been disbursed in local currency. This, he said, proves the viability of the project. Defending the projected disbursement of \$300 million over the next five years, Pinheiro argued: "The Angra-1 nuclear power plant has cost \$350 million and it is not operating satisfactorily." A total of \$26 million has been allocated to Aramar for 1991. Emphasizing the fact that the project is behind schedule due to the lack of funds, the admiral said: "We need at least twice this amount to be able to make any reasonable progress."

Pinheiro recalled that although Brazil has the technology to enrich uranium to 93 percent—the percentage required to build an atomic bomb—the government has decided to restrict uranium enrichment to 20 percent, which is enough for nuclear-powered submarines and for other areas, such as nuclear medicine. He said: "There is no intention to build a bomb and there is no reason for any apprehension in this regard because Brazil has an enviable record of peace." The admiral anticipated that the project will be operational in 1997. The previous deadline was 1995. Pinheiro reported: "The submarine will be completed during the next decade, possibly in the year 2002, if the program does not suffer any further cuts."

Brazil currently has one of the seven largest uranium reserves in the world. The mined mineral is sold abroad and then returns, enriched, at 200 times the price. The admiral noted: "This is the case with the Angra dos Reis project, for which uranium is enriched to 3.5 percent in Germany." [passage omitted]

## CUBA

### Defector Calls Nuclear Plant 'Technical Disaster'

#### Details Poor Quality Control

PA0606042691 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2005 GMT  
4 Jun 91

[Text] Washington, 4 Jun (EFE)—Cuban nuclear installations under construction "are a technical disaster" that can only be corrected if they are destroyed, it was stated today in Washington by Cuban citizen Vladimir Servera—who was in charge of the complex's quality control and who sought asylum in Canada in May.

Servera and his fellow citizen, Jose Oro, who also refused to return to Cuba after completing specialized studies at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Research Institute in Massachusetts, today explained in a news conference the "series of technical defects" that afflict the Juragua nuclear plant, located in Cienfuegos Province.

During the news conference sponsored by the Cuban-American Foundation, which is led by Cuban refugee Jorge Mas Canosa, Vladimir Servera said that all the deficiencies in the soldering of the pipes and other vital joints would render the operation of the nuclear reactors under construction impossible. He stated that 10 to 15 percent of the soldered joints have been approved by Cuban Government inspectors even though they have many visible defects that are "contrary to the regulations of the Soviets," under whose techniques and supervision the construction is carried out in Cienfuegos.

The Cuban deserter said that his country lacks the scientific capability to conduct a "radiographic inspection" of the nuclear plant under construction, which is generally the way to ascertain the quality of such work.

In addition to his annoyance over the lack of "quality control" guarantees at the Cuban facility, Servera—who himself specialized in nuclear safety in Moscow—said he had requested asylum in Canada because, he emphasized, "I love freedom and I do not share Cuban dictator Fidel Castro's ideals." "We cannot possibly have our own ideas in Cuba and I wanted to have my own," it was emphasized by 27-year-old Servera, who sought the Canadian authorities' protection during a stopover on a flight from Moscow to Havana on 16 May.

Shortly before Servera's and Oro's statements, Florida Republican Senator Connie Mack said that he has asked U.S. President George Bush to demand that the USSR stop all forms of aid to the Havana regime for the construction of its nuclear facility. Mack said that the White House must hold the granting of economic aid to Moscow contingent on the suspension of all economic assistance to Cuban President Fidel Castro, particularly for the construction of nuclear reactors that, he emphasized, "would represent a grave risk to the security of the American people."

The U.S. Department of State said last week that the Cuban nuclear installations under construction "apparently" met all the safety requirements established by international organizations.

Meanwhile, Ariel Ricardo, spokesman of the Cuban Interests Office in the United States, said on Monday that Washington's criticism and warnings about the Cuban nuclear plant are part of a U.S. campaign to make believe that the country represents a threat.

#### Director Insists Facility Safe

PA0606044491 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2245 GMT  
5 Jun 91

[Text] Havana, 5 Jun (EFE)—Andres Garcia de la Cruz, director of the National Nuclear Safety Center (CNSN), today reasserted the efficacy of the safety measures under which the first Cuban nuclear facility is being built in Juragua (Cienfuegos), approximately 300 km east of Havana.

Garcia de la Cruz' statements to the Cuban media represent a reply "to the campaign unleashed by the U.S. propaganda media," which recently voiced doubts about the Cuban nuclear facility's safety, he said. The CNSN director added that the U.S. doubts "are a political argument" which "can be countered with techniques and scientific exactness."

Garcia de la Cruz also reported that the Cuban authorities have scheduled the opening of the Juragua facility for 1993, and "the civilian construction of the facility is almost finished." The Cuban technician recognized that the facility's pressurized water technology dates back three decades, but "technical modifications" have been made to "increase the international safety guarantees that are demanded in these projects." Garcia de la Cruz said that the international experts who have visited the Juragua facility and know about its safety measures include William Lee, chairman of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, and Hans Blix, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Garcia de la Cruz added that Cuba already has 500 specialists prepared to start operating the facility, and each of its reactors (he did not specify how many) will save 600,000 tons of oil per year, so "the nuclear alternative is an undeniable resource for the country's development."

#### Commentary Outlines Policy on Nuclear Weapons

PA1805184791 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish  
0000 GMT 16 May 91

[Commentary by Roberto Morejon]

[Text] In today's world, where world powers continue to manufacture missiles with nuclear warheads, Third World countries find it difficult to join the list of nations that have unilaterally disarmed themselves. While peace and cooperation are achieved among the world powers,

Third World countries are subject to threats and aggression if they refuse to accept the latest political and economic options.

The experience gained from the latest U.S. military interventions in Panama and Iraq justify the steps taken by small nations which, despite their limited resources, are compelled to set aside budgets for defensive purposes. Cuba is among those states because U.S. aggressiveness over the last 32 years has forced Cuban authorities to divert essential economic resources to guarantee their ability to retaliate in the event of an attack.

Cuban leaders think that as long as no effective steps are taken toward a general and complete disarmament, the security of small nations will only be ascribed to those that are capable of preparing themselves for their own defense. These principles apply to Cuba's position concerning conventional weapons disarmament and the abolishment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Cuba endorses the various initiatives presented at international forums for the eradication of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of atomic energy. However, the obstacles which preclude its full admission to the Tlatelolco Treaty still prevail. In 1967, that document established the world's first nuclear-weapon-free region in Latin America and the Caribbean. Many states joined the treaty later on, and they have invited Cuba to become a signatory nation.

However, the persistent U.S. hostility; its refusal to give up the use of military weapons against Cuba; and the periodic arrival of boats equipped with nuclear weapons at Guantanamo Naval Base, represent obstacles that preclude Cuba's inclusion in the treaty.

Cuba recently became involved with, as a permanent observer, the work carried out by the Organization for the Abolishment of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, (OPLANALC). This was interpreted as an eloquent sign of the island's intentions to eliminate that type of weapon throughout the world.

## ALGERIA

### PRC Denies Helping Manufacture Atomic Bomb

LD1905195991 Algiers Radio Algiers Network  
in Arabic 1830 GMT 19 May 91

[Text] The Chinese president has denied accusations that his country is helping Algeria manufacture an atomic bomb. He described these accusations as false and fabricated.

It is known that Algeria has already denied allegations circulated by British and U.S. newspapers that China is now helping Algeria build a nuclear reactor which, in a few years, will be able to make a nuclear bomb.

### Minister Denies Intent To Produce Nuclear Weapon

LD2105140191 Algiers APS in English  
1135 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Algiers, May 21 (APS)—"Algeria does not contemplate the manufacture of a nuclear bomb. Its objective is the mastering of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes" stated Monday Cherif Hadj-glimane, minister delegate to research and technology, at a TV programme.

The mediatic fuss aroused in this regard by the Western press, noted the minister, is aimed in fact at nothing but preventing Algeria from mastering nuclear technology. "Why at this very moment?" wondered he, in the sense that this project is not secret. It is obvious that this campaign against Algeria stems from its foreign policy. Furthermore, the minister pointed out that China was also aimed since it benefits from the most favoured nation clause.

Answering a question about the choice of Ain Ouessera in such, and potential effects of this reactor on civil populations, the minister pointed out that the criteria of such a choice are absolutely scientific. Ain Ouessera is the less seismic zone of Algeria and enjoys a sufficient quantity of water for the cooling of the reactor, ensuring thus the viability of this installation that does not have any repercussion on environment nor does it alterate sources of water supply.

About the choice of China and not another partner, the minister noted that Algeria has got through with many Western countries (France, Britain, the U.S., Germany etc.) but some of them attempted to exert political pressures on Algeria while other countries asked for huge sums of money, indeed, they even tried to delay the project. As concerns China, it asked that the project would serve peaceful purposes and this is what we agreed on since the price was reasonable.

## IRAQ

### 'Official Source' on IAEA Team Visit

JN2605123491 Baghdad INA in Arabic  
1218 GMT 26 May 91

[Text] Baghdad, 26 May (INA)—An official Iraqi Foreign Ministry source has stated that a team representing the special committee of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] visited Iraq from 14 to 22 May 1991 to get acquainted with the nuclear materials and installations in Iraq.

The source added that Iraqi scientists and experts offered the team, which included 34 members from 19 countries, facilities and clarifications that enabled it to fulfill its mission.

He pointed out that the Iraqi authorities gave full freedom to the international team to visit all laboratories, workshops, and job sites; inspect all nuclear materials; take samples and photographs, and enabled it to obtain all the scientific documents and blueprints it has requested. The responsible Foreign Ministry source added that the IAEA issued a statement on 23 May asserting that the Iraqi side showed full cooperation and met all the international team's demands.

The source also said that the Iraqi authorities noticed the existence of a paragraph in the IAEA statement stating that the international team confiscated materials that can be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and that it will transport them outside Iraq. But the statement did not mention any facts about these materials. The source stated these facts as follows:

1. The nuclear materials which the international team confiscated were originally revealed, were known to the IAEA, and were subject to regulations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2. These are the same materials whose existence was verified by the IAEA inspectors during their visits from 18 to 22 November 1990.
3. They are the same nuclear materials that were disclosed by the Iraqi foreign minister's letter dated 18 April 1991 and whose details were disclosed once again in his letter dated 27 April 1991. There is no decrease or increase in the quantities and types of the enriched and dried [al-munaddab] uranium. The international team has not yet pointed to any uses of nuclear materials for purposes other than those specified and registered by the IAEA.
4. The IAEA knows well that due to their high radiation activity, the small quantities, and the drop in their potency level, these materials cannot be used to produce any nuclear weapons.

The official source said that the international team viewed the 24 major nuclear facilities that Iraq declared through the aforementioned foreign minister's letter.

Eighteen of these facilities, including all those subject to the IAEA system of guarantees in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, were fully destroyed. At its request, the international team also visited 70 other facilities which Iraq has not declared because they are secondary centers that included administrative offices, warehouses, services buildings, guard posts, garages, shelters, and others. Also at its request, the international team made a surprise visit to another site outside Baghdad. This site does not belong to the Iraqi nuclear energy organization, and it was subjected to aggression and full destruction. The team carried out a thorough inspection of the site.

The source concluded by saying that the Iraqi technicians explained to the international team how they managed during the U.S. air bombardment, under extremely dangerous conditions, to transfer the nuclear fuel to safe sites to avoid a radiation catastrophe. The team praised this measure and considered it a unique action.

## ISRAEL

### Ne'eman Says No Plan To Buy Soviet Reactor

*TA2005054591 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el  
in Hebrew 0500 GMT 20 May 91*

[Text] Yuval Ne'eman, minister of energy and infrastructure, science and technology, has reiterated that he will not discuss the possibility of purchasing a nuclear power station for water desalination purposes on his current visit to the Soviet Union.

Our correspondent Meron Tzur reports that Minister Ne'eman is leaving today at the head of a delegation of six scientists for an official 10-day visit to the Soviet Union. The minister will discuss the strengthening of scientific cooperation between the two countries and the implementation of a bilateral agreement on scientific research.

### Arens Blasts DPRK on Scud Sales to Syria, Iran

*OW3105162391 Tokyo KYODO in English 1454 GMT  
31 May 91*

[Excerpt] Jerusalem, May 31 KYODO—Japan will urge North Korea to put a halt to its exports of Scud missiles to Syria and other nations, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said Friday. Nakayama made the statement during talks with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, according to Japanese officials accompanying the foreign minister during his seven-day Middle Eastern tour. Nakayama told Arens Japan will take up the issue of the missile exports during upcoming diplomatic normalization talks with North Korea.

"Japan is also concerned about the problem," Nakayama was quoted as telling Arens during the talks, which took place at the official residence of Israeli Premier Yitzhak Shamir. He made the remarks in response to a request by

the Israeli defense minister that Japan pressure North Korea to contribute to protecting the regional security of the strife-torn Middle East.

Israel does not have any diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, while Japan has held three rounds of normalization talks with the country. Pyongyang also has been trying hard to improve its economic and political relations with Tokyo in an apparent bid to attract Japanese technological and financial support for its flagging economy and to avoid being ostracized by the international community.

During the talks, Arens blasted North Korea for increasing the threat to regional security in the Middle East by exporting missiles to Syria and other nations. The Japanese Government has obtained through diplomatic channels information that North Korea has been peddling dozens of Soviet-designed Scud missiles to Syria and Iran since before the Gulf war, Foreign Ministry sources said. Moscow has been Pyongyang's chief ally and major supplier of military aid. During the war in the Persian Gulf, Iraq launched Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia, in an apparent effort to provoke Israel to retaliate and thereby run the risk of involving Iranian and Syrian troops on the side of Iraq. [passage omitted]

### Officials To Study Nuclear Plants in Hungary

*TA0206181291 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew  
1730 GMT 2 Jun 91*

[Text] The chief scientist of the Energy Ministry and the head of the Israel Electric Company have left for Hungary to examine closely the efficiency of electricity-producing power plants. Our economic correspondent Gil Tamari reports that, among other things, the two will examine Soviet-made nuclear plants and will ask for the Hungarians' opinion of them. They are doing that because Israel might possibly use imported components to build an Israeli-made nuclear power plant.

## LEBANON

### 'Lebanese Forces' Ship Weapons to Border Strip

*NC1605154691 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic  
13 May 91 p 3*

[Excerpt] The "Lebanese Forces" have begun shipping heavy weapons to the southern sector occupied by Israel. The aim so far is to "store" these weapons in al-Naqurah under joint "Lebanese Forces-Lahdist" supervision and under an Israeli umbrella.

Sources have noted that the "Lebanese Forces" have been assembling their heavy weapons since Friday and moving them outside the areas of Kasrawan and Jubayl under Lebanese Army escort. At 0130 every day, roads leading to Juniyah port are closed and traffic is banned by Lebanese Army personnel so that the transportation of the following weapons can begin: T-55, T-62, and



T-54 tanks; 155-mm and 130-mm field artillery; 160-mm and 240-mm mortars; BM-21 rocket launchers; antiaircraft guns; mobile operations control armored vehicles; sophisticated communications equipment; automatic mobile kitchens; and large quantities of artillery ammunition.

Eyewitnesses have noticed that four cargo ships are docked off Juniyah port to load the weapons. These ships have taken three shipments, and seven more shipments are expected to be sent in the next few days.

Security sources in the "Lebanese Forces" have kept silent about the destination of these ships, but excluded the possibility that these weapons have been sold to rebels in Africa. Observers, however, believe that the destination of these ships is the border strip area where "Lebanese Forces" elements have already gone to unload, assemble, and guard the weapons in places near al-Naqurah. [passage omitted]

## PAKISTAN

### Editorial Says U.S. Forcing Adoption of Nuclear Option

91AS0600Z Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu  
1 Feb 91 p 5

[Editorial: "Why Does United States Oppose Pakistan's Nuclear Program?"]

[Text] Mt. Munir Ahmed Khan, chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, said in a press briefing that the United States can stop aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment only if the presence of an atomic bomb in Pakistan is proved. The fact is that Pakistan has not blasted any atomic bomb yet and the United States just cannot stop aid to us because of this amendment. However, since the U.S. President did not vouch for Pakistan not having nuclear capability, this aid will stop automatically next year. Now, after 4 months, the United States has decided to reduce aid to Pakistan by two-third and has announced to reinstate the remaining one-third aid. This means that the United States wanted to stop, reduce, or cut aid to Pakistan for some other reason and all this had nothing to do with the Pressler Amendment. One of the reasons is the fact that Pakistan is not that important for the United States after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. The second reason could be that the cold war between the superpowers does not exist now. The United States is free to do whatever it wants now that the Soviet Union is very weak. It is possible that the United States is testing the newly elected government of Pakistan by pressuring it. This government has used slogans against the United States in its election campaign. These three reasons appear to be meaningless at this time since the United States is not opposed to the nuclear programs in Israel, India, and other non-Muslim countries. Israel tops the list of the nations receiving U.S. aid, however, the United States never puts any restrictions on it. All this proves that the United States just

cannot bear any Arab or Islamic country to develop nuclear capability. That was why Israel was ordered to destroy the Iraqi nuclear program. The United States used its own forces to make Libya stop raising slogans. Now, after taking care of all this, the United States is forcing itself on Pakistan's nuclear program. The United States is increasing the number of its enemies because of this attitude. The Muslim world is especially screaming anti-U.S. slogans. Islamic countries are finding it difficult to cooperate with the United States and are going through a testing time. They look at the history of the U.S. anti-Islamic attitude and also look at the problem of Kuwait's independence and freedom. This is a difficult dilemma. The United States should understand this situation and change its policy. What is worse is that the United States is not only upset at the nuclear programs in Islamic countries, but also is opposed to Islamic fundamentalism. In its dictionary the word fundamentalism is a synonym for a curse. The fact is that no Muslim can be a true Muslim unless he believes in fundamental Islamic principles. The United States and Europe claim to be anti-religious [secular], however, they have Christian missionary school in every country including Pakistan. The first question any VIP visiting from these countries asks is if there is a church open on Sundays. Similarly, while rooms in their hotels are furnished with refrigerators full of alcoholic drinks, they also have the Bible placed in the drawer next to the bed. It is surprising that the devoted fundamentalist and very religious Europe and the United States are opposed to Islamic world's religiousness and fundamentalism. This double standard cannot only make the Islamic world unite against the United States, but also can divide the world into Islamic camp and another camp composed of Jews, Hindus, and Christians. This could start another campaign between the Cross and the Islamic laws. The United States would be fully responsible for it because of its habit of starting campaigns against Pakistan and Arab countries. The United States has never missed an opportunity to hurt Pakistan while wearing the mask of friendship. Now, our nuclear program is being kicked around even when Pakistan has assured that this program is peaceful. We have to meet the demands of our energy crisis. The whole world is benefiting from this technology in the areas of health and agriculture. Pakistan's neighbor, India, has already blasted an atomic bomb. It has three times as many resources as we have. We cannot compete with it in the areas of traditional army or ammunition. To top this all, it has atomic bombs in its arsenal. Pakistan has to meet its defense needs. Pakistan will be forced to pick the nuclear option if the United States continues to press it. We believe that Pakistan should not delay anymore. The moral from the Gulf crisis also encourages us to take this option.

### Editorial Calls for Nuclear Cooperation With Iran

91AS0716Y Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Feb 91  
p 10

[Editorial: "Iranian Speaker's Visit to Pakistan"]

[Text] The Speaker [of the Majlis] of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Mehdi Karubi, is visiting Pakistan during such a turn of events in the world affairs, when

the Islamic community's non-Arab is facing serious challenges and the regional security is facing imminent danger. Although, large oil fields are located only in Iran, in addition to deposits of other mineral resources, the geographical location of these Islamic countries in the vicinity of Soviet Russia is also very important. If Iraq did not achieve a reasonable success in the Gulf, then America and its designated Jewish and Christian lobby will stay in the Gulf and will not waste any opportunity of sabotaging the independence, security, and mutual unity of these Islamic countries. In the event of success in the Gulf, the appetite for regional conquest can reach extreme madness in America and Israel. During these extremely dangerous times, the visit of the honorable Speaker of the Iranian Majlis to Islamabad has extraordinary importance. From this we can sense that the Iranian leadership is keeping an eye on emerging political and military developments and, for regional interests, it is closely watching the situation of national unity. For centuries, Pakistan and Iran have had religious, spiritual and national cooperation. There are different on-going pacts between the two countries. But, now along with these pacts, harmony of intentions is necessary and for that it would be appropriate to conclude special pacts. In Pakistan the nuclear education is not available because we have been relying on "foreign sources". Now, the doors have been closed on Pakistani students on these sources. Pakistan's future is attached to nuclear education. It would be beneficial to regional independence and security, if Iran and Pakistan cooperate and conclude major pacts in nuclear education for joint syllabus, joint instructions, and joint laboratories. Along with it, the mutual cooperation in trade and defense should be increased rapidly, so that, based upon mutual unity, enough power can be arranged for Iran to stop the Soviet aggression in the neighboring Azerbaijan and on the other side, Pakistan is not left behind in its defense and security responsibilities in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The most important thing has to do with new opportunities for joint military role between Iran and Pakistan. Both countries will have to sit together and decide whether this military role is more appropriate if it is defensive or should it have aggressive, revolutionary, and belligerent color to it. We believe that it should not have a "belligerent color." Rather, it is necessary to have belligerent capabilities and resources. Under the circumstances, in belligerent resources, the cautious planning in life and defense and a deathlike feeling cannot be successful [sentence as published]. The back-bone of superpowers, which as they are in the Gulf they continue their political shelling on Iran and Pakistan, cannot be broken. We believe that a closer military cooperation between Iran and Pakistan is just a matter of time and both countries should pay closer attention to it.

#### Editorial Praises China's Help in Nuclear Development

91AS0761Y Lahore NAWA-I-WAQF in Urdu 2 Mar 91 p 10

[Editorial: "Acquisition of Chinese Power Plant"]

[Text] After the negotiations between Pakistan's prime minister Nawaz Sharif and the Chinese prime minister Li Peng in the Chinese capital Beijing, it was announced that China will procure an atomic power reactor to Pakistan. The agreement to supply this plant will be

signed this year after financial and technical details are settled. China had assured us of providing a nuclear reactor during the Junejo and Benazir governments and now again during the Sharif government. This development is encouraging to us since China has admitted that it is not ready to accept the pressure that the United States and other Western nations have been putting on it about not supplying a nuclear reactor to Pakistan. France had broken its promise after signing the agreement to supply Pakistan with a reprocessing plant. China has demonstrated its unfailing friendship with Pakistan by keeping its promise. It is realistic to expect that this plant will be procured soon. Our government had repeatedly announced that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and the establishment of nuclear power plants is crucial for our economy and energy shortage. Unfortunately, the Western world views our program with a jaundiced eye and we are being treated unfairly. Keeping in mind how China had helped us in our development plans, we should be optimistic about acquiring this power plant. Our energy needs cannot be met by our only nuclear power plant, KANUUP. We will be able to meet our needs in a very crucial area with the help of China. China has shown that it is a true friend by ignoring the anti-Pakistani propaganda. We cannot praise it enough.

#### USSR General Staff on Pakistan's Nuclear Arms

91WP0102A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 91 First Edition p 5

[USSR Armed Forces General Staff response to reader's query: "Does Pakistan Have the Atom Bomb?"]

[Text] How far has Pakistan progressed in work on the creation of nuclear weapons?

[signed] Zh. Tasoyev, Tashkent.

The commencement of Pakistan's realization of its own nuclear program may be dated 1972, when, following his defeat in the war with India, then Prime Minister Z. Bhutto adopted the decision to make his country a nuclear power. Initially taken insufficiently seriously throughout the world, this program has in the last three or four years been compelling discussion with ever-increasing disquiet.

The reason is Islamabad's persistent endeavor to gain access to nuclear technology, using both contacts at government level and the purchase of the necessary technology directly and via a network of dummy firms. Thus in 1989 an official investigation in the FRG confirmed that the Neue Technologie company had exported to Pakistan a plant for the separation and enrichment of tritium, which is used to increase the power of nuclear arms.

At the present time Pakistan is either on the threshold of possession of nuclear weapons or has already crossed this boundary. Summarizing the expert evaluations of the majority of Western specialists, they agree that Islamabad has the necessary quantity of fissionable material to produce four to 10 atomic bombs and that scientists are in a position to impart to uranium the requisite configuration and accomplish a first-generation warhead within a short space of time—if the appropriate decision is made by the country's military-political leadership.

### **Sharif Proposes Conference on Nuclear Issue**

#### **Cooperation With U.S., USSR, PRC**

*BK0606141891 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network  
in Urdu 1400 GMT 6 Jun 91*

[Text] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has put forward a new proposal to solve the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia in the regional context with the cooperation of the United States, Soviet Union, and China. He announced the proposal in his address to the concluding session of the year-long defense course at the National Defense College in Rawalpindi today. He said Pakistan would like three nuclear powers to consult and meet both India and Pakistan to arrive at an agreement for keeping this region free of nuclear weapons on the basis of proposals already made or new ideas that will emerge. He emphasized that a nuclear nonproliferation regime thus negotiated during the multilateral consultations should be equitable and nondiscriminatory.

#### **Relations in Region**

*BK0606160591 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network  
in Urdu 1500 GMT 6 Jun 91*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] He observed that the only practical way to resolve all the problems in this regard is to arrive at an agreement that may guarantee security for nonnuclear states and that will be acceptable to all nations of the region. This will go a long way toward creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and strengthening peace and stability in South Asia, thereby enabling the people of the region to utilize their resources and capabilities in accelerating the pace of economic development and improving the lot of the masses.

Expressing Pakistan's readiness to participate in the multilateral consultations on this issue, the prime minister said there are indications that the United States, the Soviet Union, and China will be inclined to support such a regional approach. He expressed the hope that these three countries will be ready to help Pakistan and India free the region of nuclear weapons. He also hoped that the concerned countries will respond soon to the proposal he has forwarded for the first time so arrangements can be finalized and the conference convened as soon as possible.

Referring to the proposals for nuclear proliferation put forward by Pakistan from time to time, the prime minister said he is satisfied with the fact that the regional approach on disarmament is being gradually encouraged and nuclear-free zones have been established in certain areas. He said he is ready for bilateral agreement with India or for a regional arrangement to keep South Asia free from all types of weapons of mass destruction. Nawaz Sharif categorically stated: We cannot and will not take a step that will jeopardize our national security.

On the security situation on borders, Nawaz Sharif referred to India's military buildup, its development of medium-range missiles, and its nuclear program, which is not subject to safeguards. He said India's refusal to solve the Kashmir problem peacefully and its efforts to suppress the struggle of the Kashmiri people in occupied Kashmir through brutal methods and large-scale use of force has increased the threat to Pakistan's security. Pakistan cannot neglect its security requirements nor can it be stopped from providing moral and political support to the Kashmiri people's struggle for realizing their right of self-determination in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Referring to Pakistan's relations with the United States, the prime minister said even though the United States and Pakistan both fully support efforts for nuclear nonproliferation, the present difficulties are the result of differences in the two countries' approach toward stopping nuclear proliferation. The United States is paying special attention to Pakistan's nuclear program despite the fact that India has already carried out nuclear testing and possesses several uranium enrichment and reprocessing installations that are not subject to safeguards.

On Pakistan's relations with other countries, Nawaz Sharif said friendship with China is the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy and their friendship is a means to strengthening peace and stability in the region. [passage omitted]



**Bush Chemical Weapons Policy: 'Major Progress'**

PM1605155991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 16 May 91 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "Military-Political Commentary": "A Danger They Realized Too Late"]

[Text] I cannot bring myself to write that war may produce some positive results in international life, but that is what seems to have happened this time. U.S. President G. Bush has issued a statement on the problem of chemical weapons. The Gulf war, he stressed, once again evoked the specter of chemical weapons and demonstrated that unscrupulous regimes can and will threaten terror with these weapons as long as we allow these weapons to exist. It was this fact, the head of the U.S. Administration pointed out, that prompted him to submit an initiative that should facilitate the quickest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons and destroying stockpiles.

What is the essence of the initiative? The United States is officially renouncing the use of chemical weapons for any purpose, including for a retaliatory strike against any state. This decision will be implemented when the convention banning chemical weapons enters into force. As far I can see, this constitutes major progress in the U.S. stance. After all, prior to this the United States admitted the possibility of using chemical weapons in retaliation even after the conclusion of the convention. This, however, aroused understandable suspicions among the other countries involved in the Geneva talks.

Another positive element is the United States' avowed readiness, regardless of other states, to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles within 10 years of the convention's entry into force. Washington did not confine itself to suggesting that other countries follow this example. It stated its readiness to offer technical assistance to ensure that the destruction of toxic agents worldwide is carried out effectively and safely.

I think that the latter is of great importance for the Soviet Union too. The USSR possesses considerable stocks of these weapons. I must be honest and admit that we have encountered serious difficulties in practically resolving the problems involved in destroying these weapons. It is the opinion of our specialists who visited Johnston Atoll in the Pacific and saw the operational installation for the destruction of chemical munitions that the Americans have made marked achievements in this sphere. So technical assistance could prove extremely opportune.

The President's statement indicates that Washington is prepared to help eliminate another obstacle retarding the conference's work. Many experts have, up to this time, expressed doubt as to the possibility of effectively verifying fulfillment of the convention. The United States has now suggested new methods of monitoring to inspect facilities suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons.

Thus many knots that seemed extremely tangled yesterday are being unraveled today with striking ease. Provided the will is there, so to speak. Will the U.S. latest initiative bring about rapid progress at the Geneva conference that began 14 May? I would, of course, like to think so. But I am afraid that a number of developing countries differ somewhat from Washington in their view of the Gulf war, experience of which prompted the U.S. President to submit the new initiatives. People in these countries saw how many problems the possibility of Iraq using toxic agents caused the mighty U.S. grouping and the psychological effect that the threat of using these weapons against peaceful cities had. I think that this might have reinforced some people's idea that chemical weapons are an effective "poor man's atom bomb." I also suspect that some states will be in no hurry to part with their chemical weapons in conditions where Washington has begun to talk about a "new world order" in which the United States is given the role of world gendarme. While some will rush to obtain them.

So people in Washington have realized too late the danger of chemical death. Both the United States and the Soviet Union must now make considerable extra effort to conclude the convention. Far more than would have been necessary had the United States submitted this initiative before war broke out in the Gulf....

**Pakistani Nuclear Arms Program, U.S. Role Viewed**

91WP0091A Moscow EKHO PLANETY in Russian  
No 3, Jan 91 pp 20-23

[Article by Leonid Kotov: "How To Steal a Bomb"]

[Text] They loaded a truck that was supposed to deliver 20 tons of enriched uranium ore to the port of Cotonou [Benin] at the Arlit Uranium Mine which is in the northern part of Niger. It was intended for France. However, they were not waiting for it there.

The truck disappeared without a trace somewhere along the way. It disappeared just like a mirage in the desert. Searches were unsuccessful. A while later, the uranium unexpectedly "surfaced" in Pakistan, at the nuclear center at Kahuta.

Last summer, tensions drastically worsened on the Indo-Pakistani border in the area of Kashmir. Tank and mechanized divisions from both sides were concentrated toward the Line of Control that serves as the boundary between the portion of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan and that occupied by India and the Indian and Pakistani air forces were brought to a heightened state of readiness. In Delhi, they accused Islamabad of supporting Muslim terrorists operating in Kashmir who are seeking the secession of this strategically important area from India. Pakistan shot back its own arguments and demanded concessions from its neighbor. A military conflict between the two countries appeared to be inevitable.

It was during this period that an American reconnaissance satellite transmitted sensational photographs. On them was the Pakistani nuclear center in Kahuta and a truck column with a secret cargo which had departed from it headed in the direction of the air force base at Sargodha. The American experts were in a panic. According to their assumptions, there were four nuclear bombs in the trucks. The alarm increased even further after experts clearly saw in other photographs that F-16 fighter bombers deployed to Sargodha were being equipped with racks for atomic bombs.

The information obtained by the CIA was sent to the White House and to congressmen. The United States demanded from Islamabad guarantees of the peaceful direction of its nuclear program and the conduct of an inspection of Pakistani nuclear facilities by International Atomic Energy Agency experts. In response, customary assurances of the absence of an atomic bomb and of Pakistan's plans to develop one and a refusal to permit an inspection were received from Islamabad. Washington decided to suspend aid to Pakistan and to "freeze" previously approved appropriations for weapons sales, including 60 F-16 aircraft.

"This step is evidence that the United States has arrived at the conclusion that Pakistan has developed a nuclear explosive device," stressed the LOS ANGELES TIMES. "Some administration representatives now are privately saying that they closed their eyes to nuclear research efforts in Pakistan in the 1980's when it was used for weapons deliveries to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan."

Thus, it took Washington more than 10 years to recognize the obvious: Pakistan has broken through to possession of nuclear weapons and now the international community will have to deal with one more state that has achieved nuclear status.

Pakistan has joined the club of nuclear countries without a lot of noise and through the "back door." And nevertheless the secret of the development of the "Islamic Bomb" exists as before. How could it happen that this not nearly most economically developed state that ranks 24th on the list of the world's 34 poorest countries could reach out to the nuclear button? From where did the nuclear scientists, nuclear raw material, and scientific production equipment appear and, finally, where did Islamabad get so much money for the research work which requires enormous expenditures? Let us attempt to answer some of these questions.

December, 1971. The last salvos of the short-lived Indo-Pakistani War have just thundered. The people of Bangladesh are solemnly celebrating the declaration of independence of this young state that has been formed on the site of the province of East Pakistan. In Islamabad, the mood is not nearly as festive for understandable reasons.

During that sad time for the country, Premier Z.A. Bhutto recalled his own words that were spoken in 1965 after Islamabad's so unsuccessful war with India. At that time, giving free rein to his feelings, he attempted to stir

up the nation and turn it toward the hope that the days of an intoxicating victory celebration over the neighboring power would yet come. "Pakistanis will eat grass and leaves or even starve, but the country will develop its own bomb," Bhutto said.

The words he spoke became deeply ingrained in the memory of young scientist and metallurgist Abdul Kadir Khan who was studying in Belgium at the time. This man was also destined to make a decisive contribution to the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapon and to direct the execution of super-secret Project 706.

The appearance of the just starting-out Pakistani scientist at the Urenco Uranium Enrichment Plant in Holland remained insignificant for many people. The efficient and industrious Doctor Khan rapidly made friends with his coworkers at the enterprise and became an indispensable assistant while carrying out complex experiments and he was a participant in the solution of many important scientific and production questions. The Pakistani's work zeal made a profound impression on the boss of the atomic center in Almelo where the doors were opened for Khan to scientific laboratories and to fissionable materials production secrets.

Bypassing strict directives, the modest engineer managed to gain access to documentation on uranium enrichment technology that might also be used for military purposes. No one paid attention to the fact that the Pakistani was constantly writing down some sort of notes and was closeting himself with secret documents. Khan's interests appeared to be far removed from political and worldly problems and he seemed to be interested only in science and well, maybe, his career which, by the way, the scientist himself did not hide. His sudden departure to Pakistan offered hope to the nuclear scientist's Homeland where it seems a place had been prepared for him at the largest nuclear research center in the small city of Kahuta near Islamabad and became an even more unexpected development for his colleagues.

Doctor Khan returned home with an impressive wealth of knowledge about many of Urenco Consortium's "secrets." But, having left Holland, he did not intend to break off contact with his former colleagues. They frequently thoroughly answered his letters which contained many questions concerning nuclear technology. The charming Pakistani scientist was not just involved with a "friendship by correspondence." Soon the Dutch firm was completing his order for the production of more than 6,000 pipes made from special types of steel. The specialists knew that these pipes are an important component of a uranium enrichment facility using the centrifugal separation method. This technology permits someone to obtain Uranium-235 simply and cheaply. But in Holland, no one paid attention to the order from a country which had refused to sign the treaty which banned nuclear weapons testing in three spheres and on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The insight did not come immediately.

Urenco directors only learned the reason for Doctor Khan's hasty departure from Holland several years later. The super-agent's unexpected departure was caused by the fact that the top secret blueprints for the latest uranium enrichment plant had ended up in his hands. Their shipment to Pakistan would brook no delay and the scientist-spy hurriedly collected his suitcases.

The history of Pakistan's acquisition nuclear technology resembles an engrossing detective novel with chases, disappearances, thefts, and the other mandatory attributes of this genre. The French magazine *NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR* called A.K. Khan "one of the most talented spies of our time." However, even the most capable agent could hardly have succeeded in penetrating Urenco's secret laboratories by himself. Whoever helped the spy is still unknown although suggestions that A.K. Khan did not complete his "moves" without the complicity of some Western states' intelligence services have been expressed in the press more than once. But then again, the scientist-spy's activities alone do not exhaust all of the riddles associated with Project 706.

While an Amsterdam court was hearing Khan's criminal case and sentencing him to four years imprisonment in absentia, an event occurred at Arlit Uranium Mine in Niger, thousands of kilometers from Holland, which at first glance did not have any relation to the "Islamic Bomb."

Pakistani spies prowled throughout the countries of Europe and America while searching for nuclear "know-how," buying up everything that could come in handy for A.K. Khan's team of 135 physicists and nuclear scientists that was making a reality of Z.A. Bhutto's idea on Islamabad's nuclear potential. Success in England accompanied them where they managed to get hold of 30 inventory [not found] for gas centrifuges. In Switzerland, the Kora and VAT firms sold condensers, capacitors, and vacuum equipment. It is true that similar operations in the United States were not completely successfully conducted.

At first, Retired Pakistani Army Colonel Sarfaras Mir was unlucky when he arrived at New York's Kennedy Airport with a shipment of several roomy containers on a summer day in 1981. The customs declaration filled out by the colonel listed: "mountain climbing equipment." It is hard to say just what it was that caused the customs agents to be suspicious but at their request the shipper arrived to open the containers which it turns out contained 5,000 pounds of zirconium.

In October 1984, something similar occurred in Houston where Pakistani Agent Nazir Akhmad Vaid was arrested after he was pronounced guilty of the clandestine acquisition in the United States and export of a shipment of special electronic devices used in atomic bomb detonators. These devices—so-called crytrons—were acquired from a Massachusetts firm which sold them to the foreigner without the required special U.S. State Department authorization to do this. The American authorities

reported that the Pakistani agent would remain behind bars until a fine of \$200,000 had been paid.

Do we need to say that Islamabad immediately came up with these funds? Two weeks later, Vaid was already free and soon arrived in his Homeland where they arranged a national hero's welcome for him. The scandal in Houston did not at all embarrass the leaders of Pakistan who assured the international community of the peaceful nature of their nuclear research program. The head of state, General Zia-ul-Haq, issued a statement at that time that the crytrons were allegedly intended... for the blinking lights with which ambulances are equipped. In Washington, they gave the appearance that they believed this....

Long before Vaid's arrest, the U.S. Administration stubbornly spread the myth that nuclear secrets are kept behind lock and key in America. Actually, by that time, three Pakistani agents were making themselves at home in American jail cells where they ended up for attempting to export component equipment for the nuclear facilities which were being hurriedly constructed by Islamabad. At first glance, statements by Washington's official representatives, which confirmed that the United States would assist Islamabad in the realization of its nuclear program only in the event that it signed the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty and provided the International Atomic Energy Agency the opportunity to become convinced that its program was pursuing purely peaceful purposes, strengthened the U.S. Administration's resolve to prevent the appearance of a nuclear bomb in Pakistan. But each time it received Pakistan's abrupt rejection of these proposals, Washington nevertheless at times did not manifest particular concern with regard to the "Islamic Bomb."

Everything happened just like in a game of cops and robbers: Pakistani agents exported secret equipment from the United States, the American authorities attempted to prevent this and even arrested several of them, but meanwhile at the Kahuta center, Pakistan's "Oppenheimer" continued working on Project 706.

In December 1987, Arshad Pervez, a Canadian of Pakistani extraction, was convicted in Philadelphia for attempting to export 25 tons of high-strength steel to Pakistan. Naturally, Islamabad denied any involvement in this matter but from the evidence submitted during the process it followed that the steel was intended to support Project 706. Congressman S. Solarz and other American legislators stated that the provision of the law on the export of nuclear equipment from the United States had been grossly violated and demanded immediate sanctions against Pakistan. But since the U.S. Administration at that time was only worried about the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, no one at the White House would have anything to do with such demands.

A short time passed and the U.S. President's aides informed him about Pakistan's and Iran's secret negotiations on cooperation in the sphere of nuclear research which could result in the development of an atomic bomb by them. But once again the head of the administration decided not to take steps to impede these plans.

Soon a notorious scandal surrounding the illegal transfer of enriched uranium to Pakistan broke out in Belgium and the FRG. Information found its way into the press about secret shipments of radioactive raw materials to Pakistani customers by the Belgian firm Belge Nuclear which jointly with the West German company Transnuclear supplied nuclear fuel and technology to "third countries."

Last year, acting through its embassy in France and through intermediaries in Canada and Switzerland, Pakistan attempted at least three times to purchase American-manufactured high-temperature furnaces that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons. Concealing its true intentions, Islamabad stated that the furnaces were necessary for the production of high quality steel for surgical instruments. Apparently, the American Administration knew what kind of "instruments" this was a question of and forced the producer of the furnaces to turn down a business deal with the Pakistani representatives.

By this time, the authoritative U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT magazine had published a sensational report that "Pakistan, which has six atomic bombs each of which has a yield equal to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, has begun developing a second generation nuclear weapon." If we consider the information in the Indian press on the work that has begun in Pakistan to develop a hydrogen bomb, the list of information on Islamabad's nuclear program becomes quite impressive.

Until recently, the U.S. Administration thought it was more important to support Pakistan in the political and military spheres rather than to totally use its influence to force Islamabad to abandon its program to develop nuclear weapons. Every time Congress attempted to take steps to get Pakistan to terminate Project 706, the White House emasculated its initiatives which, covered by the president's right to veto, was concerned about attaining short-term political and strategic advantages instead of an effective struggle for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The history of the moves and countermoves between the president and the legislators is rather interesting. For example, take the 1976 Symington Amendment which prohibits the United States from providing assistance to any state that does not have nuclear weapons but which is importing uranium enrichment technology along with technical equipment for these purposes. In 1979, American assistance to Islamabad was suspended in accordance with this amendment. Washington had to react to

the numerous reports that Pakistan had acquired uranium enrichment technology in Western Europe and was conducting construction of a nuclear center at Kahuta.

However, from 1981 through 1984, when the first decision on repealing the Symington Amendment was in force, Pakistan managed to progress far ahead in the execution of its nuclear program. A uranium enrichment plant has been erected in Kahuta according to information confirmed by U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Construction of a second such enterprise has begun in Golra near Islamabad. Still one more nuclear center for the production of fissionable materials was ready to begin operations at Chashma by the middle 1980's. According to assessments, Pakistan acquired the capability to annually produce up to 40 nuclear devices when the Golra facility attained full capacity. Information has also appeared in the world press on the secret New Labs Nuclear Laboratories in Rawalpindi where they obtain plutonium.

American experts have arrived at the conclusion that China is actively assisting nuclear research in Pakistan and that China has provided "valuable design assistance" to Pakistan in testing a detonator for nuclear weapons using crytrons that have been secretly imported from abroad. Chinese assistance has provided Pakistan the capability to produce nuclear weapons without conducting "overt" testing of them.

In 1984, Senator A. Cranston announced at Congressional hearings that it was possible that Pakistan would have 30 uranium bombs at its disposal by the beginning of the 1990's. A year later, THE WASHINGTON POST, citing CIA information, wrote that Islamabad possesses the scientific potential and the assets to develop a "primitive, but effective" atomic bomb. It also provided a description of A.K. Khan's brainchild. "The Islamic Bomb consists of a nucleus of enriched uranium nearly six inches in diameter which is installed in a steel sphere that is approximately 13 inches in diameter. This sphere is surrounded with more than 100 pounds of conventional explosive charges in a special shape. The charges explode, compressing the uranium nucleus to such an extent that it attains critical mass. A chain reaction arises..." the newspaper shared this information that was obviously published with the knowledge of the CIA.

Zia-ul-Haq attempted to convince the world community that the "atomic bomb does not have a nationality" and therefore it is not horrible if Pakistan is one of the states that has this weapon. In his words, this is a matter of Pakistan's prestige which is "ready to beg, borrow, or steal" for the sake of obtaining the desired bomb.

Under legislative pressure, U.S. President Reagan sent a message to Zia-ul-Haq in September 1984 in which he asked Pakistan to provide guarantees that it would not enrich uranium by more than five percent. Enrichment higher than this level would entail serious consequences for American-Pakistani relations. They think that Pakistan complied with this promise for just about one year.



The United States easily detected Islamabad's deception but did not begin to undertake any sanctions against it.

In 1987, the Symington Amendment's validity had expired with regard to Pakistan. In 1988, it was removed for a second time for a two and a half year period.

The United States annually provides Islamabad with nearly \$600 million in economic and military aid. Until recently, the White House refused to terminate aid to Pakistan, stating that it did not have convincing evidence of the existence of a secret program to develop nuclear weapons.

Under Congressional pressure, in October 1990 President G. Bush nevertheless suspended the provision of aid until the United States receives assurances that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons and is not attempting to develop them. Previously approved appropriations and weapons sales, including deliveries of F-16 fighters, have been frozen. The abrupt deterioration of the situation in the Persian Gulf region also played a role here.

Today, Pakistan continues to deny the presence of nuclear weapons in its country. However, it refuses to sign the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty or to authorize international experts to inspect the facilities on its territory that are causing suspicion.

#### **Nuclear Safety Technology Transfer Expected**

*LD1405171591 Moscow TASS in English 1206 GMT 14 May 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo, May 14 TASS—An agreement to grant nuclear power station safety control technology to the Soviet Union is expected at the London meeting of leaders of the seven industrial countries next July, the newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN reports with reference to Japanese governmental sources.

The threat of serious accidents at nuclear power stations, like the one that occurred in Chernobyl in 1986, remains real, notwithstanding the progress achieved in nuclear power engineering and the perfection of nuclear power plant equipment. It is therefore important to enhance the efficiency of nuclear power plant safety control.

Western countries, which have the most advanced equipment in this field, plan to grant the Soviet Union up-to-date technologies to control the safety at nuclear power plants, prevent new large-scale nuclear accidents in our country and protect the world environment, the newspaper reports.

If the G-7 leaders agree to grant such technology, the newspaper notes, Japan will actively seek to broaden cooperation with the Soviet Union in nuclear power engineering.

The USSR is the world's third nuclear power producing nation, after the United States and France, the newspaper notes.

#### **Netherlands Proposal To Raise Submarine Accepted**

*LD2005075791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2230 GMT 19 May 91*

[Text] The Soviet nuclear powered submarine Komsomolets sank in the Sea of Norway in April, 1989. That tragedy is remembered by many people. It is still lying there today at a depth of more than 1,500 meters. The world has no experience of successful recovery operations from such a depth, but the submarine must be lifted—in addition to the nuclear reactor there are two torpedoes with nuclear warheads on board. Although the radiation situation in the area where the submarine was lost is normal, who can guarantee that the situation won't change as the years go by? A senior staff member of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, Yuriy Soldatov, gave the following example in a conversation with a journalist from PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK. An American submarine, the Scorpion, once suffered an accident and ran aground. A year later heavy metals were discovered in analyses of the water. We have learned a great deal from Chernobyl. The Komsomolets sank in an area where fishing is carried out by the Soviet Union, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Great Britain. And of course the vessel has to be raised. The government gave the task of solving the very difficult problem of raising the submarine to the Rubin Central Design Bureau for maritime technology. A competition was announced at which several projects were put forward. The experts were obliged to turn down all Soviet projects and go for the proposals of a Netherlands deep water operations consortium. The Netherlands intend to complete all preparatory work quickly and raise the submarine in the summer of 1992.

#### **Country Struggles To Maintain Arms Market Status**

*PM2405155391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English 21 May 91*

[Abridged Reprint of Article by Yuriy Ursov: "Guns and Bullets: To Sell or Not To Sell?" from Russkiy Kuryer in Russian No. 10]

[Text] I sometimes think that the armed conflicts which occurred between the Vietnam and Gulf wars were pre-programmed for testing new weapons and appraising potential markets for them. Indeed, every possible weapon—from ballistic missiles to ladies' pistols—can be obtained from a powerful financial and industrial group comprised of arms-manufacturing countries, regardless of their political systems. Experts say that profits from arms sales rival only those of trade in narcotics, uranium or cut diamonds. Small wonder that

the states which sell guns keep their mouths tightly shut about sales volume and their clients.

What's more, there is tacit agreement to prevent any information even about one's rivals in this field from being made public. Several countries have long since monopolised and divided the global arms markets in accordance with their priorities. It is only possible to get an idea of the state of the weapons markets as a result of direct and indirect analysis of information which sometimes appears in the press, the state and expenditure part of national budgets and the scarce data leaked by commercial banks and other sources.

It should be stressed that in spite of the slogans prevailing in the world arena at any given moment, arms sales are always the most important means for the intervention of industrialized countries in the politics and economics of Third World countries. I was in Iraq two weeks before the Gulf War broke out. (It is common knowledge that half of the armaments which the Iraqi Army had at its disposal came from the Soviet Union—tanks, planes, missiles (modernized with the help of Federal Germany), rifles, etc.) At that time the global press wrote a lot about the need "to rebuff the Iraqi aggression" and "finally stop arming dictatorial regimes". At the same time, representatives of a famous American firm in Baghdad signed a letter of intent under which the American side was to sell Iraq several billion dollars' worth of weaponry after the war was over, thereby outpacing Soviet arms sellers.

There are also economic reasons why arms sales are so popular with all the arms-manufacturing countries, without exception. Aircraft carriers, missiles, ABM systems and aircraft, which cost a lot of money, labour, resources and energy, are practically useless from the point of view of economic development. They cannot be used instead of tractors or combine harvesters. But the cost of their manufacture can be made up quite lavishly by their sales, for payment is more often made in oil, diamonds, polymetals, and other rare raw materials, rather than money.

So, what changes can be expected to occur on the arms market after the Gulf conflict is settled? The Western press, which has been dealing with this problem a lot, arrives at the conclusion that the struggle for arms markets will be further aggravated in spite of all the calls for disarmament, because the geopolitical and economic interests which clash in this struggle are too large.

In a bid to reward the participants of the anti-Iraqi coalition in the Gulf War, the U.S. has already sold 46 F-16 fighters and 188 modernized Hawk missiles to Egypt and 50 F-15 fighters to Israel. There are plans to sell Saudi Arabia a thousand units of armoured hardware, including a new-generation M-1A2 tank, Patriot missiles, Apache helicopters, F-15 fighters and an AWACS aircraft. Although this deal has been postponed, it may be resumed any time soon.

The volume of planned arms sales in the Middle East, which is estimated at 18 billion dollars, is evidence of the huge diplomatic and financial influence of the arms exporters. The Bush Administration promised new weapons to Egypt, Turkey, Israel and other countries which backed up the U.S. in the war by forming an anti-Iraqi coalition and trying to take Israel beyond the framework of the conflict. Defense Secretary Cheney said that only vast deliveries of weapons to "American friends" in the Middle East could replace the numerous US troops after they left the region. Other major arms suppliers, including Britain, France and the Soviet Union, do not give any signal either that they are going to curtail arms sales in the post-war Middle East. British arms-manufacturing companies, for instance, hope to sell at least 400 Challenger tanks to Saudi Arabia and a mine-sweeper to the United Arab Emirates. Arms trade becomes an increasingly important means of revenue because other export possibilities are either insufficient or sharply shrinking. Czechoslovakia, for instance, is not a newcomer on the arms market. According to recent reports, Prague agreed to sell Iran 300 Soviet-made T-72 tanks in spite of assurances by its Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier to discontinue traditional arms sales (which gave the country half of its hard currency receipts). Yugoslavia has already sold between 300 and 400 such tanks to Kuwait and Syria. The Soviet Union also sells weapons in the drive to get hard currency.

Experts contend that demand for traditional Soviet weapons, which were used in the Gulf War, could fall. Besides, its Third World clients already owe the USSR a lot of money and will hardly be able to pay more than two per cent of the debt. The USSR's own foreign debt has sharply increased due to the reduction of oil production (oil was the main source of hard currency receipts). The share of mechanical engineering—mostly weapons and spare parts—is appraised at 13 to 17 per cent of all Soviet exports. Furthermore, casting aside all talk about so-called common human values (the West, as we see, does not bother with them when it has a chance to make money by selling guns), it should be admitted that the Soviet defense industry, into which huge funds were invested for a very long time, could help extricate the Soviet economy from the crisis by manufacturing competitive products. The ruble's rate of exchange in dollars is different in arms trade than on the black market. Presumably, the USSR spends annually between four and five billion rubles on the manufacture of guns for sale. It nets, according to American sources, 11,650 million dollars from arms sales. Even if we assume that 1 dollar is worth 10 rubles (the rate prompted by the real correlation between demand and supply on the Soviet domestic market), the arms sales hard currency receipts will be sufficient to cover all defense spending and buy 20 billion rubles' worth of consumer goods (in domestic prices). There is much to be considered before converting a plant which manufactures anti-aircraft missiles to the production of juicers. It might be more profitable to sell one missile and buy 100 thousand juicers and other Western commodities, which are certainly of better

quality than ours. We build better tanks, while they make better VCRs. So why should we invest billions into conversion, which would be an additional burden on our people? It could happen that we would forget how to manufacture good guns, and wouldn't learn to make good VCRs either.

At present, the Soviet Union is struggling to maintain its position on the arms market. Hard currency owners are now offered state-of-the-art Soviet weapons. At an international show in the Philippines it displayed its MIG-29 fighter, which is superior to many other planes of its class. Under the conversion plan, three out of five tank-building plants are to be shut down. One of the remaining plants will manufacture tanks for export only. China, which is our closest rival in arms trade, uses a very pragmatic approach to arms sales. During the Iran-Iraq war China sold arms to both warring parties.

As for the United States, arms sales can, according to the magazine *U.S. NEWS & WORLD* report, be a way of supporting the economy on the eve of "approaching meagre times". The Pentagon suggests that the U.S. should sell upwards of 20 fighters a year until the manufacture of newer tactical fighters begins and other large-scale programmes are carried out. The Bush Administration proposes allocating one billion dollars from the federal budget to guarantee funding arms sales to foreign countries.

A comprehensive analysis conducted by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences shows that there are diverse ways of selling arms, while the mechanisms of control over such sales are weak and vulnerable. Besides, there are no international legal norms to restrict the sales of arms to developing countries. Existing agreements on control over proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons can only slow down the process of their spread in the Third World. It is worth mentioning, for instance, Iraq, which has acquired the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. While the nuclear non-proliferation agreements are more or less fulfilled, there is no effective mechanism for compliance with the documents covering other types of mass destruction weapons.

In the meantime, rivalry for arms markets is even fiercer among NATO partners. Experts predict that demand for conventional weapons, and in particular infantry-support helicopters and ABM systems, will increase to such a degree that even the weak opposition by advocates of an agreement on control over arms sales to instable regions will be suppressed.

The problem of arms sales is of global importance. A semi-starved Third World is emerging on the global scene. Some of the leaders do not conceal their intention to establish a new world order. With whom will the USSR side—the U.S. and other civilized countries? Or will it head a movement of south against North on a world-wide scale?

Sooner or later the Soviet Union will have to decide.

### **Poll Reveals Ambivalence on Nuclear Deterrence**

*OW'0606031991 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0930 GMT 5 Jun 91*

[From "Viewpoint"]

[Text] According to the news agency "DATA", the National Public Opinion Studies Center took an opinion poll in March 1991 among 1953 persons representing the urban population of the USSR. They were offered [as received] to answer if they consider implementation by military servicemen of an order to fire on peaceful citizens to be crime.

61 percent said "yes".

23 percent do not think it is a crime.

17 percent did not give a clear answer.

In the same poll respondents were asked whether they agree or not with the assertion that the creation of nuclear weapons helped avert the 3rd World War.

31 percent agreed.

1 out of 4 said such assertion is wrong.

44 percent found it difficult to answer.

Margin of error—3 percent.

### **Uranium Processing Agreement Reached**

*LD0306202791 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Jun 91*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] As reported by POSTFACTUM, an agreement has been drawn up between a combine in the Siberian town of Seversk and the West European consortium of (Yevrodiv) to enrich uranium ore up to four percent. One hundred and fifty tonnes of uranium have already been processed. The raw material is transported to Siberia from Europe via Leningrad.

### **Delegation in France Discusses Nuclear Safety**

*LD0406040891 Moscow TASS International  
Service in Russian 1620 GMT 3 Jun 91*

[By correspondent Igor Kuleshov]

[Text] Paris, 8 Jun (TASS)—A Soviet-French protocol on cooperation in the field of guidance in the prevention of nuclear radiation accidents and overcoming the aftermaths of such accidents has been signed in Bourgen-Bresse by A.P. Tsygankov, deputy chairman of the State Commission for Emergency Situations of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and (Jean Ansyu), secretary-general of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Nuclear Safety for the French prime minister's office.

The Soviet delegation was in France at the invitation of the prime minister of the French Republic from 26 May to 2 June inclusive. The delegation learned in detail about the arrangements in France for organizing the safety of nuclear plants and protecting the population during emergency situations. The delegation attended nuclear power center in Bugey.

The protocol that was signed can, the document notes, serve as the basis for the subsequent development of bilateral cooperation in the framework of which the Soviet delegation invited French experts to take part in a seminar on the aftermath of the accident in Chelyabinsk Oblast, which is proposed to be organized in the USSR in the autumn of this year, and also to discuss the setting up of a Soviet-French research center.



## FRANCE

### Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty To Be Signed

#### Proposals Made

*AU0306103591 Paris AFP in English 0955 GMT  
3 Jun 91*

[Text] Paris, June 3 (AFP)—France published a series of proposals for world-wide disarmament on Monday and announced that it would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The presidential press office said the plan included decisions at national, regional and world level and covered both conventional and so-called weapons of mass destruction.

The presidency said France would sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which up to now it had refused to do, and "hopes that all states will do likewise".

The French plan calls for a ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks and urges the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to conclude a ban treaty by the end of this year.

France urged all states to adhere to such a ban "from the outset".

#### Disarmament Plan Outlined

*LD0306141291 Paris France-Inter Radio Network  
in French 1100 GMT 3 Jun 91*

[Text] [Announcer] The Elysee made public this morning the global plan for disarmament presented by France. Francois Mitterrand has decided to sign the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty. In this plan, France also comes out in favor of banning and eliminating all chemical arms.

[Pinto] Yes, here before us is the plan for arms control and disarmament. Only five pages long, it may look rather modest, but in reality it is not so much an extraordinarily detailed and methodical plan as a kind of codification for what should be done. The first thing to be noted is the fact that armaments are treated categorically. It is quite interesting, because the plan does not pretend to immediately impose a general and complete global disarmament. There is interest paid to the regional aspect of things, that is, regions of the world which are more troubled than others. Finally, this plan will be handed over to the UN secretary general. It is therefore an essentially political plan.

Armaments are going to be treated category by category, a ban will be imposed, as you said, on chemical arms, people are besought not to make dirty bombs any longer. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the plan tries to institute an international register of arms sales, a register which lists the nations which supply [arms] to the whole planet. I bring to your attention that the five biggest arms

selling nations in the world are, as if by chance, the five Security Council nations. The UN secretary general holds a register and knows who makes what for whom.

There is also an interesting phase: ballistic surveillance. That is, the whole world—those who own satellites in any case—is going to put them at the disposal of those do not, in order to know what is going on here and there. It is interesting, too. This is a pious hope in my view because some will have to be convinced, and those who are trying to make bombs are rather numerous.

Finally, as you said, measures of trust are put forth, measures of the same kind as those of the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This means that as a proof of goodwill, others are allowed to come and see what is going on. The Pakistanis, for instance, who are in the process of making a bomb, will then have to understand the concern of these trust measures and the meaning of the desire to go and see what they are doing to this effect.

[Announcer] So when France says that it is ready to sign the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty, what does this mean? Does this mean that it is going to stop?

[Pinto] No, no, this does not mean that it is going to stop making bombs. This means that this kind of Gaullist citadel which was the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is completely outmoded. The debate has completely changed, anyway. Debate has changed because national independence in 1963, with all that it presupposed in order to break the bipolar balance, is also outdated. This means that a text is to be signed, but France will continue to possess the bomb, of course. One has become well convinced, however, that proliferation vis-a-vis those which are poorest is a real danger for the whole planet, and that one will have to be able to deprive those who are likely to divert technology from this too-modern technology without so much depriving them from a nuclear technology for civilian and development purposes.

#### Giscard Comments

*LD0406084291 Paris France-Inter Radio Network  
in French 0600 GMT 4 Jun 91*

[Text] The French disarmament plan is welcomed by the international community. President George Bush sent a message to Mr. Mitterrand to congratulate him on his decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty dates back to 1968. Until now, France has always refused to sign the treaty in the name of its independence. As Valery Giscard d'Estaing explained yesterday, conditions are not the same today.

[Begin Giscard d'Estaing recording] I am in favor of France signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. When I was president of the Republic I had considered signing it, but the circumstances at the time were not right; as you know, this treaty represented the possibility of a certain control over the development of our own deterrent force at a time when East-West tensions made

it imperative for us to hold to total independence and to full control of our decisions and our technology. In the new circumstances in which we find ourselves, I agree with the decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I hope we will succeed in reaching sufficient concrete and operational measures so as to be able to actually respect the great intentions we have announced. [end recording]

### **Dumas: Signing NPT Does Not Mean Halt to Testing**

AU0406124991 Paris AFP in English 1211 GMT  
4 Jun 91

[Text] Paris, June 4 (AFP)—France's decision announced Monday to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not mean France will put a stop to nuclear testing in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said Tuesday.

Mr. Dumas, speaking to legislators from countries belonging to the Western European Union, said "non-proliferation is one thing, a country's defence policy is another."

He told the WEU meeting in Paris that the credibility of France's defence policy, based on a strategy of nuclear deterrence, "calls for its arsenal to be kept up to date, hence the need for tests."

Mr. Dumas said that when prospects for disarmament were deemed adequate, "France will take the appropriate measures.... In the meantime, France will not stop these tests which are indispensable for modernising its armament and maintaining it at a minimally effective level, that is at a level capable of meeting its defence requirements."

### **Matra Moves Ahead on Missiles, Satellites**

91ES0728B Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French  
25 Apr 91 p 33

[Article by Dominique Commiot: "Matra Making Comeback in Armaments"]

[Text] Smart missiles and spy satellites are now accepted as key elements of military strategy and tactics. Jean-Luc Lagardere's group is well positioned in these domains....

With military budgets declining, Matra's future in the arms business seemed clouded. Because of its size: It is not among the 10 biggest European manufacturers in the sector. And because its flagship products, the air-to-air missiles, were highly dependent on the success of the warplanes built by Dassault, a company whose order book has been getting very thin. To the point that rumors (denied) of Matra Defense being sold to Deutsche Aerospace (Dasa) were spreading throughout the arms industry in 1990.

The Gulf war changed things. Defense budgets are still anemic, but they are going to be reconfigured. For

example, the Apache air-to-ground missile now being developed, with Matra as lead contractor, could evolve into a stealth cruise missile with a range of 600 to 800 km, instead of the 180 km currently planned. The group is winding up its development of its Mica air-to-air missile, the first multimission missile designed in Europe. Mica may eventually equip American F18 fighters: A contract to adapt it to the aircraft was signed with McDonnell-Douglas in 1989. And Matra is working more and more with other European firms in the missile domain. A general technical cooperation accord has just been signed with Italy's Alenia.

Matra is pinning its main hopes on observation satellites and telecommunications. Pierre Joxe, the minister of defense, has already begun beating the drums: "Europe, whatever form it may take in the future, must somehow have its own space capabilities, without which it will be futile to talk about a European defense." For his part, Helmut Kohl has ordered studies on the feasibility of military satellites. According to Frederic d'Allest, general manager of the Matra group, there can be no doubt: "We will see European satellite initiatives in the coming months," he confided to USINE NOUVELLE.

### **Personal Factor**

Now it so happens that Matra is Europe's leader in observation satellites. Matra is responsible for the four Spot civilian photographic observation satellites. Matra and Aerospatiale are the lead contractors for the two Helios spy satellites ordered by the General Delegation for Armaments [DGA] in association with Italy and Spain. Matra also has the lead in the ERS-1, a civilian radar observation device which Ariane is scheduled to loft into orbit on 3 May. All seven satellites are built on the same platform, Matra's MK2, a fact that augurs well for the profitability of the programs.

With MS2i, a joint subsidiary of Matra and SEP, the group is a leader in ground receiving stations, a highly profitable branch of the space business. MS2i also has impressive expertise in processing the images sent back by observation satellites.

In addition to all these advantages, Matra also benefits from a more personal factor. As head of CNES [National Center for Space Studies] and Arianespace, Frederic d'Allest has amassed a great deal of experience in European cooperation, experience which could prove very useful in putting together a military observation program.

Jean-Luc Lagardere's group is also well-positioned in the field of space-based military telecommunications, with Matra as lead contractor for the Telecom 1 satellites (and their Telecom 2 successors), since France's Syracuse network is installed on Telecom 1. And Matra Marconi Space is in charge of the live load for Britain's Skynet system.

Matra's prospects could affect the shape of the new industrial alliances presently being forged in Europe.

Especially prospects for an alliance with Dasa. "We want to fill all the gaps in the European satellite market. For the sake of coherence, we must work with only one French partner in this sector. We will make our choice within the next few weeks," Dasa President Jurgen Schrempp told *USINE NOUVELLE* in January. Will it be Matra or Aerospatiale and Alcatel Espace? The decision is still pending. "Dasa is so hesitant because its top people want to see which way Europe is headed with regard to military satellites," Frederic d'Allest believes. Europe's apparent direction could make Matra a most attractive partner.

These trends may begin to come into clearer focus next June, about the time of the Bourget exhibition.

### **Arabsat Signs Contract for Satellite Launch**

*LD1505200691 Paris Domestic Service in French  
1100 GMT 15 May 91*

[Text] A new contract for the Ariane rocket: This morning the chairman and managing director of Arabsat signed a contract for the launching of Arabsat IC, a third telecommunications satellite for Africa and the Middle East. The new satellite could be launched at the end of the year by an Ariane-4 rocket.

### **Underground Labs Planned To Study Waste Storage**

*91WP0099A Paris LE MONDE in French  
16 May 91 p 46*

[Article by Jean-Francois Augereau]

[Text] On Wednesday, 15 May, Minister of Industry Roger Fauroux presented to the Cabinet a bill on radioactive waste storage which members of Parliament are scheduled to begin debating in early June.

The bill, based on recommendations from Christian Bataille's report (*LE MONDE*, 14 December 1990), clarifies the substance of the text drawn up by the minister of industry in mid February. It reflects the government's concern for providing itself with all the means needed to make a decision in no less than 15 years! Before that time, it will be impossible to decide on any final storage site for this long-lived, highly radioactive waste, the amount of which will approach 85,000 cubic meters by the year 2000.

In the meantime, the ministry hopes to expand research capabilities in three areas: waste containerization, intensive reprocessing, particularly in the case of so-called long-lived "alpha" waste, and burial and storage. However, it is not possible to regulate such sporadic research actions in a legislative text. Consequently, the minister of industry, who hopes that Parliament will have a word to say on this highly sensitive issue, has determined that a public report on the progress of such studies would be transmitted to him every year.

Likewise, following a period not to exceed 15 years, an overview of the results of such research will be drawn up so that the Executive Branch may propose to the Legislative Branch the solution it favors for the final storage of waste. For this purpose, two underground laboratories costing 2 to 3 billion francs each will be built (1 to 1.5 billion francs in investments, the remainder to be devoted to operation of the facility, which will create 150 jobs).

### **Pilgrim's Staff**

No radioactive waste will be stored therein, but controlled sources of radioactivity may be placed there in order to study the behavior of deep geological formations, as is being done in Germany in the Asse salt mines (Basse-Saxe). It has not been specified when these laboratories will go into operation or where they will be set up.

In connection with this latter point, the minister seems to be hoping that some unchallengeable figure will take up his pilgrim's staff and clear the way, provide information, and gather possible candidates from among the municipalities. "Financial incentives" analogous to those which the EDF [French Electric (Power) Company] pays for its nuclear power plants could be granted to such host communes and departments (on the order of 50 to 60 million francs a year).

The final point is the status of the National Agency for the Management of Radioactive Waste (ANDRA). Many were disturbed by its membership on the Atomic Energy Commission, emphasizing that ANDRA was thus both judge and jury. It is a situation that could change rapidly since the ministry wants to give more autonomy to this agency, which would then issue its own orders on research programs to the suitable laboratories and institutes.

### **Cresson on Initiative for Weapons Destruction**

*AU2205162391 Paris AFP in English 1555 GMT  
22 May 91*

[Text] Paris, May 22 (AFP)—France is planning an initiative, in collaboration with Washington, in order to limit arms sales and ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, French Prime Minister Edith Cresson said Wednesday.

The Socialist prime minister announced the initiative, but gave no further details, during a policy statement to parliament following her appointment last week. "In a spirit of peace and security for all, France has undertaken a reflection, and is planning an initiative, in close liaison with the United States, to limit arms sales and ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," she said. She added that in the light of the Gulf war and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact military alliance, the French government would be taking a "new look" at its defence policy.

But she stressed that Paris remained committed to its independent nuclear strike force, which would be maintained "at sufficient levels for deterrence." "The time has come to think about the nature and number" of France's strategic nuclear weapons, she said, adding that conventional weaponry would also come under scrutiny.

French President Francois Mitterrand is expected to announce modifications in France's nuclear arsenal, currently divided into land, air and sea components, as part of an overhaul of defence strategy to be debated in parliament. France had to be prepared to "resist a major aggression in Europe alongside our European allies, and show determination to stop it whatever the cost, if necessary by the use of our deterrent force," Mrs. Cresson said. At the same time, France should be prepared to use its Rapid Action Force for "more limited interventions in various theatres".

### Enriched Uranium Stocks Survived Gulf Bombing

AU2305111391 Paris AFP in English 1047 GMT  
23 May 91

[Text] Vienna, May 23 (AFP)—French and Soviet enriched uranium supplied to Iraq survived the Gulf war virtually intact but is recoverable and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] expects to take possession of it soon, an IAEA spokesman said here Thursday [23 May].

His statement came after the return here Wednesday of a 34-strong team of IAEA experts who inspected two Iraqi nuclear sites at Tuwaitha near Baghdad and stocks of uranium, in conformity with U.N. resolutions.

France supplied uranium enriched at 93 per cent to Iraq and the Soviet Union supplied enriched uranium at 80 per cent.

The spokesman said most of the uranium stored in special shelters to protect it from allied bombing during the Gulf war had remained intact. It had been placed under seal by the IAEA to prevent any tampering before it is dismantled. However, about a third of the 80 per cent enriched uranium is under the rubble of Iraq's destroyed reactors. It had been located with the aid of special detecting equipment and appeared to be intact. The spokesman said retrieving the buried uranium would be more difficult than recovering stocks from shelters. But he said this was a "technical problem" which could be resolved in a short time.

He said negotiations were going on with several countries to decide what to do with uranium impounded by the IAEA, that is whether to store it, reprocess it or send it out of the country.

The IAEA inspection mission was conducted under the terms of the U.N. cease-fire resolution calling for the destruction of Iraq's stockpiles of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Inspectors said Iraq's report to the IAEA last month accurately recounted the condition of its known nuclear material and facilities.

Iraq reported that allied bombings had destroyed 18 of its 24 nuclear facilities and that it had moved about 26 pounds of enriched uranium from its nuclear facility at Tuwaitha before the bombings began in January. Twenty-nine pounds of uranium were buried under the two reactors at Tuwaitha destroyed by allied bombing, Baghdad said.

In Washington, U.S. officials quoted the IAEA team as saying that removing the buried uranium would be much less dangerous than previously feared in part because the uranium appeared not to be leaking from its casings. The team was due to make recommendations about how to remove the buried uranium, the officials said.

One official said that once the uranium was retrieved, the IAEA should send it back to France and the Soviet Union although Moscow had expressed some opposition to that idea.

### Defense Minister Proposes Reform of Nuclear Force

AU0706133391 Paris AFP in English 1239 GMT  
7 Jun 91

[Text] Paris, June 7 (AFP)—France should drop one of the three components that make up its nuclear force, Defence Minister Pierre Joxe has said here.

With the year 2000 on the horizon, the French deterrent force should possess, as well as submarine-launched nuclear missiles, a second component "of unquestionable credibility," Mr. Joxe said in a parliamentary debate which continued into the early hours of Friday. This would mean dropping one of the other two components in the current nuclear triad, the minister said.

The French nuclear force currently consists of five nuclear-armed submarines, 18 Mirage-IV aircraft equipped with medium range air-to-ground missiles and 18 strategic missiles in silos in the south of France. The latter two systems will soon be outdated, but Mr. Joxe did not indicate whether the airborne or the strategic missiles might be eliminated.

Several possibilities are being studied for modernising the nuclear force, including development of medium-range air-to-ground missiles and, possibly in co-operation with Great Britain, mobile strategic ground-to-ground missiles. Mr. Joxe also said that there would be cuts in the size of the Army, Navy and Airforce. He did not say how big the cuts would be.

Whether to raise or lower defence spending dominated the debate on the Socialist government's policy. Currently the figure is 3.37 per cent of gross domestic product. The conservative opposition was calling for it to be raised to four per cent, while the Communists wanted to cut defence spending by 6.9 billion dollars.



"France cannot go all out for a big increase in defence spending," Mr. Joxe said, but neither could it "rush headlong into new cuts."

Referring to European defence, Mr. Joxe reiterated that France wished to see Europe create its "own military capacity." French cooperation with a proposed NATO rapid deployment force should be possible, he said, as had been done in the past with NATO commands.

### **Nuclear Plant Shut Down for Safety Violations**

*AU0706171291 Paris AFP in English 1655 GMT  
7 Jun 91*

[Text] Paris, June 7 (AFP)—A nuclear plant in the southern French town of Pierrelatte was shut down on Tuesday on orders from the Ministry of Industry following safety violations, the ministry announced on Friday.

Plant authorities failed to report two incidents on April 29 and 30 in which radioactive materials were mishandled and came close to critical mass, risking a spontaneous nuclear reaction, the ministry's Nuclear Installation Safety Bureau said in a statement. The incidents were rated at danger level two on an ascending scale of six and revealed "serious deficiencies" in security arrangements, the bureau said.

The bureau said the plant would be reopened after the approval of new security measures proposed by plant managers.

## **GERMANY**

### **Missiles in Former GDR Still 'in Working Order'**

#### **Defense Expert Confirms**

*LD0906104391 Berlin ADN in German 0954 GMT  
9 Jun 91*

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN)—Medium-range missiles on German territory which are under the command of Defense Minister Stoltenberg are, according to a report in BILD AM SONNTAG, said to be still "in working order." The defense expert Ulrich Adam (Christian Democratic Union) from Greifswald confirmed to the newspaper that establishments of the former NVA [National People's Army] were recently viewed in the Potsdam/Brandenburg region, at which point it was ascertained "that the whole stock of SS-23 medium-range missiles is standing there, still in working order." Taken aback, the Defense Ministry is now considering how to destroy them, the Sunday paper reports.

The Free Democratic Party is calling for speedy action by Stoltenberg so that, following the destruction of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles called for under the INF treaty, the Federal Republic "is no longer the only country that has medium-range missiles in Central Europe." [passage omitted]

### **Ministry Denies Report**

*LD0906141791 Berlin ADN in German 1357 GMT  
9 Jun 91*

[Excerpt] Bonn/Hamburg (ADN)—The Defense Ministry on Sunday denied a newspaper report that the Bundeswehr possesses SS-23 medium-range missiles from former National People's Army stocks.

Spokesman Karlheinz Reichert said it is correct—and the ministry has known it for a long time—"that the Bundeswehr owns 24 SS-23 missiles without launchers and without nuclear warheads." Their destruction is being prepared. The timing is dependent on the completion of current development work on an environment-friendly destruction process, but will definitely be before 1994. Of the original four mobile launchers, three have been destroyed and one given to a museum, the spokesman said. [passage omitted]

### **BND: Soviet Chemical, Nuclear Arms Remain**

*AU0606141291 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German  
6 Jun 91 p 2*

[Ewald Koenig report: "Nuclear Weapons in Former GDR"]

[Text] Bonn/Berlin—Contrary to all assertions by Soviet military officials and an assurance by the Bonn Defense Ministry, the FRG Intelligence Service (BND) is convinced that Soviet chemical warfare agents and nuclear weapons are still stored in the former GDR. The Soviets are delaying their withdrawal because the removal poses technical problems for them, the BND claims.

As DIE PRESSE learned from the BND, German intelligence experts proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union will cooperate with the United States in the withdrawal and scrapping of the weapons. The U.S. Armed Forces have already removed their chemical weapons from western Germany and transported them to an atoll where they will be scrapped. As recently as in April, Soviet military officials assured Defense Minister Stoltenberg that no nuclear or chemical weapons are stored on the territory of the former GDR. However, German intelligence circles believe that the extraordinarily tight control of some military facilities suggests the storage of explosive material there. Thus, it is no big surprise that nervous Soviet guards fired shots at Bundeswehr officers who wanted to explore Soviet depots—such as in Altengrabow, for example.

The BND has since asked the Bonn Government to inform the governments in the former GDR about the nuclear weapons depots. According to the BND, the laender governments do not know anything about such weapons.



### **Agreement Signed on Ending Uranium-Ore Mining**

*LD1605165691 Berlin ADN International Service in German 1416 GMT 16 May 91*

[Excerpts] Chemnitz (ADN)—The era of Soviet-German uranium ore mining in Saxony and Thuringia has come to an end. The final line was drawn by Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann; Ambassador Dr. Werner Reichenbaum representing the foreign minister; and Vitaliy Konovalov, USSR minister of atomic energy and industry, when they signed a government agreement in Chemnitz today. The agreement still has to be ratified by the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Only then will it be possible to transform the firm into a company under German law.

Moellemann said during the signing ceremony that the takeover of shares opens the way for a comprehensive restructuring of Wismut and spoke of the future of the five newly created company sectors. [passage omitted]

Under the agreement the Soviet Union transfers its 50 percent stake in Wismut to the FRG. According to the opening balance in June last year, Wismut's total share capital amounted to 2.7 billion German marks. At the same time, the agreement absolves the Soviet side of financial participation in the costs for shutdown, reequipping and redevelopment. [passage omitted]

### **Trial Inspection for Chemical Weapons Offered**

*LD2105223891 Berlin ADN in German 1548 GMT 21 May 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The FRG is for the first time extending invitations for a trial inspection—by an international team—to test the "verification instrument" for a worldwide and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and as a contribution to the current negotiations in Geneva. The trial inspection will take place at a Luftwaffe site near Bad Kreuznach on the 22 to 24 May 1991. The participants in the inspection team come from Egypt, Argentina, Great Britain, Iran, and Pakistan.

A statement by the Foreign Ministry says that for the purpose of a reliable verification of the chemical weapons convention, a verification system must be developed which will be more costly and comprehensive than the regulations under all the existing arms control agreements due to the special characteristics of the subject under negotiation. In future, every signatory state is to be granted the right to demand at short notice an inspection of any site in another member state by the technical secretariat of the future chemical weapons organization.

### **Reactor To Destroy NATO Ammunition Planned**

*LD2505155891 Hamburg DPA in German 0927 GMT 25 May 91*

[Excerpt] Dragahn (DPA)—Following an arrangement with the Defense Ministry in Bonn, a reactor for the

destruction of NATO reject ammunition is to be built at Dragahn (district of Luechow-Danneberg) in Lower Saxony. This was confirmed to DPA today by the private bomb disposal firm Kaus and Steinhousen, which has been disposing of ammunition at Dragahn for several years. Dragahn, a place in the former border area along the inner-German border, became known in the eighties as a possible location for a nuclear reprocessing plant. [passage omitted]

### **Nuclear Safety Consortium Established With France**

*LD0106192491 Hamburg DPA in German 1341 GMT 30 May 91*

[Text] Lille (DPA)—Germany and France agreed today to establish a consortium under European law for promoting nuclear safety in Eastern Europe. In a joint statement on the summit in Lille (northern France), the two sides also express the hope that the two firms in the Nuclear Power International, Siemens-KWU and Framatome, will "actively" help provide safety equipment for the Soviet reactors in Eastern Europe. The consortium of the authorities dealing with nuclear safety will compile safety analyses for nuclear plants and make proposals for improvements in conjunction with representatives of the Eastern European states. Bonn and Paris will also establish a working group to prepare a joint initiative for reactor safety, which will be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming EC summit.

### **Party Rejects Debate on Nuclear Modernization**

*LD3105100691 Hamburg DPA in German 0626 GMT 30 May 91*

[Text] Osnabrueck (DPA)—Karl Lamers, the foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parliamentary groups, rejects the debate triggered by the NATO defense ministers in Brussels on the modernization of nuclear weapons at this time. In an interview with NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG (Thursday's edition), the CDU politician says, commenting on the final communique, that the first priority now should be giving up nuclear short-range missiles. The United States and the Soviet Union should commit themselves to this.

In any case, an agreement should be strived for with the Soviet Union concerning the United States' nuclear systems, which will remain in Europe in the future, and it should not aim to only limit the systems of both sides but should mean mutual control.

### **No New Nuclear Plants Planned in Eastern Germany**

*AU0406114591 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 31 May 91 p 33*

["froee." report: "No New Nuclear Power Plants in the East"]

[Excerpts] Bonn—The three electricity supply companies RWE Energy [Rhine-Westphalian Electricity Works], Preussen Elektra, and Bayernwerk do not plan to build new nuclear power plants in the new laender for the time being. As the chairman of the managing board of the Munich-based Bayernwerk AG company, Jochen Holzer, told journalists in Bonn, the RWE works and Preussen Elektra AG company, which belongs to the VEBA concern [United Electricity and Mining Corporation], are not willing to initiate permit procedures because the enterprises believe that basic consensus among all major parties, including the Social Democratic Party of Germany, for nuclear energy cannot be achieved. Holzer made it clear that his enterprise does not approve of the procedure of the two partners. Coal power stations are now planned instead of the nuclear power plants. [passage omitted]

However, the renunciation of nuclear projects does not mean "that we will not build any nuclear power plants in the future," Holzer stressed.

Coal power stations with a corresponding capacity will now be constructed instead of the nuclear power plants. East German brown coal or imported hard coal will be used, but no west German brown coal. A decision on the locations will be made before the end of the year.

#### **Minister Urges Curbs on Illegal Arms Exports**

LD0406095991 Berlin ADN in German 0915 GMT  
4 Jun 91

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann has once again called for quick and effective measures against illegal arms exports. The Berlin office of the Economics Ministry announced today that Moellemann said he was disappointed that the intermediary Bundestag and Bundesrat commission had not reached an agreement on the legal package for tightening export controls. He appealed to the Bundesrat not to place concern about individual questions in the draft above the need for quick and effective measures against illegal arms exports.

A failure of the draft law will prevent a number of undisputed regulations from being implemented, including higher penalties and possible confiscation of all profits from illegal export deals, Moellemann said. If one loses sight of the overall purpose of the package, this will damage the credibility of German politics, especially at the international level.

### **NORWAY**

#### **India, Romania Heavy Water Investigation Seen**

91WP0098A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
7 May 91 p 16

[Article by Harald Stanghelle: "Heavy Water Affair to the Storting"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] "Norway must react forcefully in the heavy water affair. We might freeze our aid to India, as we now do to Kenya," says member of the Storting, Paul Chaffey to AFTENPOSTEN.

The Socialist Left Party's spokesman informs us that he will raise this matter during the Storting's question hour 22 May.

AFTENPOSTEN announced yesterday that neither the Norwegian prosecuting authority nor the Foreign Ministry's bureaucracy could proceed with their investigation into two controversial sales of Norwegian heavy water. The investigation shows that a total of 27.5 tonnes of heavy water has ended up in India illegally. It is now up to the political leaders in the Foreign Affairs Ministries to bring up the matter with India and Romania, the two countries involved. Romania is the country that resold to India 12.5 tonnes of heavy water Norwegian authorities believed intended for the Romanian nuclear power program, a program under international control.

"Since police investigators, our diplomats, and our bureaucracy are unable to proceed there is no doubt in my mind but that the case has to be dealt with on a political level," Paul Chaffey notes.

The Socialist Left Party's spokesman points out that Norway, in the light of its attitude to nonproliferation of nuclear material outside international control, cannot now refrain from using all possible measures in a case where Norwegian heavy water has turned out to have gone astray.

Unlike India, Romania has signed the nonproliferation treaty. International experts think that India for its part has an expansive program for developing nuclear weapons, and for this process the country needs "unofficial" heavy water that no one will insist on inspecting.

"The new Romanian leadership should themselves be interested in helping to clear up this matter. As far as India, which is one of Norway's main partner countries in connection with development aid, is concerned, it should lead to consequences if the country does not cooperate in clearing up how the Norwegian heavy water was used," Paul Chaffey says. He thinks that "freezing" the aid—as has been done with Kenya for quite different reasons—might be a suitable reaction.

Sale of Norwegian heavy water has been a headache for the Foreign Ministry for several years. The most troublesome case concerned a sale to Israel. However, that case was resolved exactly one year ago. Kjell Magne Bondevik's state secretary had then laboriously negotiated an agreement with the Israelis to return the heavy water, since Israel would not permit satisfactory inspection.

At the Storting it was especially the Socialist Left Party's Theo Koritzinsky and former Prime Minister Kare Willoch who took a personal interest in this problem.

"We must demand that Indian authorities explain what happened to the heavy water after it was illegally delivered in Bombay," Kare Willoch said to AFTENPOSTEN two years ago when it became obvious two years ago that a West German businessman had deceived Norway and delivered a shipment of heavy water to India. But the Indians refused. Now there is another case involving heavy water, [this time] with Romania as a go-between, and India as the main customer. Kare Willoch was not available for comment yesterday about the latest developments in the case.

## SPAIN

### Ministry Denies Installment of Missile System

PA0406155191 Madrid OID Diplomatic Information Service in Spanish 1016 GMT 4 Jun 91

[Text] EL INDEPENDIENTE has reported that yesterday the Defense Ministry, in response to a report that appeared in ANDALUCIA ECONOMICA Magazine, denied that an operation to install a missile system along the Gaditan coast to guard the strait and forestall a possible attack by Morocco is under way. Defense Ministry sources pointed out that "this information is unfounded and that there is at this time no operation of this sort under way." Meanwhile, diplomatic sources have flatly denied that an attack by Morocco is possible at this time.

### ENDESA President Fuster Interviewed on Reorganization

91WP0097A Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Apr 91 pp 100-102

[Interview with Feliciano Fuster, president of the National Electric Power Enterprise, Inc., ENDESA, by Cruz Sierra; place and date not given: "I Prefer To Win the Nuclear Battle and Lose Valdecaballeros"]

[Text] The president of the country's leading electric company, the state's National Electric Power Enterprise, Inc. (ENDESA), expresses approval of new nuclear power plants in Spain, provided that they offer more and better guarantees than those of the present plants. He states his views on the sector's future restructuring and its special relationship with private enterprises.

This 67-year-old Majorcan is vehement, rational, intelligent, and slightly irritable. He knows by heart everything there is to know about energy in Spain, and becomes annoyed when you fail to understand his lengthy ratiocinations from the outset. He has successfully directed Spain's number one, state-owned electric company and, while heading it, has accrued what are probably the largest profits for a Spanish enterprise in 1990: over 108 billion pesetas.

[Sierra] Has ENDESA accrued such great profits because of its business, or because it has an able president?

[Fuster] Discarding the second reason, let's say that ENDESA is a very large enterprise, with an impressive capital. We produce a third of the national energy, and we also have two distributing companies on the peninsula and another two on the islands. If we combine the profits of all of them, that profit level should not be so surprising. But if the income return that we accrue from invested capital is analyzed, you will see that we haven't earned so much money.

[Sierra] Is it true that those profits are not associated with the presumed privileges that ENDESA enjoys as a public enterprise, as your colleagues in the private sector charge?

[Fuster] I would not confuse privileges with unique circumstances. One is that we specialize in producing energy. Another is that ENDESA originates from a contract concluded years ago with the private sector, which converted the company into the ENDESA of today. What were we supposed to do afterwards; dissolve at the time that the contract went out of existence? Well, no. An attempt has been made to lend continuity to the business. It is thought that all of the sector's problems stem from ENDESA's profits, and that isn't true. We earn money because we know how to cut costs, not because we are taking it away from anyone. We have made the group's companies profitable where others claim to be losing money.

[Sierra] In other words, your only secret is good management....

[Fuster] Our only secret is specialization. Some companies are engaged in producing energy, while ENDESA, and others, are engaged in distributing it, as in the case of ERZ [United Power Company of Zaragoza] and ENHER [Ribagorza National Hydroelectric Enterprise]. The sole concern of the director of our ENHER subsidiary is to provide good service to its consumers. On the other hand, the director of a complete cycle company, of the type that produces and distributes, must be concerned over whether or not its hydroelectric dams have water, the potential problems in its nuclear power plant, or the price of oil for its fuel plants, as well as customer service...in short, a mess. Do you realize what it's like to have to do everything? It is as if aside from a reporter you tried to be a typesetter, editor, and newsstand vendor—assuming all of the duties for the newspaper. Then you would surely not have the capacity to complicate this interview with Feliciano Fuster to the extent that you are.

[Sierra] Speaking of nuclear power plants, do you advocate opening the Valdecaballeros power plant?

[Fuster] Everyone here wants someone to get involved in the issue of Valdecaballeros. You are making it difficult for me, but anyway, I would view the problem of that nuclear power plant from this perspective: If opening Valdecaballeros facilitates the introduction of new nuclear energy in the future, I would open it. If opening it might represent an obstacle to that energy's future in

Spain, I would not do so. I prefer to win the nuclear battle and lose Valdecaballeros.

[Sierra] But you would agree that nuclear power plants represent a real risk in terms of the lack of security.

[Fuster] Nowadays, nuclear power is being challenged socially, and rightly so, because many accidents have occurred all over the world. But such risks are greater in the old power plants than they will be in the new ones. The technology is evolving, and power plants will be very safe. European, American, and Japanese manufacturers are working to eliminate the risks in reactors.

[Sierra] Is nuclear power really indispensable?

[Fuster] It is necessary for the future of Spain. There is no doubt about that. Therefore, it is not so important to take a "yes or no" position on Valdecaballeros, but rather a "yes or no" position on nuclear energy. My response is yes, as part of a mix of energies, and I have signed a document, along with my colleagues in the UNESA [Electric Unity Company] management, calling for Valdecaballeros. Obviously, if the accidents at Vandellós or Asco had not happened it would be easier to introduce nuclear energy.

[Sierra] Let's return to ENDESA. To what do you attribute the fact that a state enterprise has embarked on expansion, buying shares in private companies such as Sevillana or FECSA [Electric Power of Catalonia, Inc.], or even purchasing other entire firms, such as Electra de Viesgo?

[Fuster] Look, it is a matter of effectiveness or ineffectiveness, not of the public or private sector. It is as bad to withdraw from positions because of the mere fact of being public as it is to advance for the same reason. In our view, growing isn't even a minimum objective; nor is our remaining at a standstill either.

[Sierra] But not long ago ENDESA was confined to little else than producing electricity, and now it has almost become a "shark" in the electrical sector, buying here and there anything that comes within its sights. Is there an overall strategy of expansion for this public enterprise?

[Fuster] No such strategy exists, nor is there any intention of assuming positions in the sector. Our every action is based on a different objective and origin. In Viesgo there was the circumstance that its major stockholder, the Bank of Santander, considered it fitting and beneficial for its interests to give up those shares. It had no desire to remain, and offered us the company; and we took it because it served our interests.

[Sierra] And what about Sevillana, and FECSA?

[Fuster] The case of Sevillana is completely different. We increased our share in that company because we considered a pooling of interests between ourselves and Sevillana to be positive. They are distributors and we are producers. And as for FECSA, we increased our share

from 12 to 14 percent, because Santander had sold it to us in the same transaction as that involving Viesgo. But we intended to put that company on solid footing with Iberduero, Hidrola, and ourselves. They then dropped the talks, because they apparently wanted to become associated in one enterprise.

[Sierra] Let us understand clearly, does ENDESA intend to keep FESCA?

[Fuster] How do I know? That's something for the future, and I prefer to discuss realities.

[Sierra] Do they not sometimes berate you in the Ministry of Industry for being too aggressive in business?

[Fuster] No, no. We all know one another, and at my age I'm not allowed to make mistakes in interpretation. They may be able to interpret me or not, but I must be able to interpret the others: my colleagues and the minister. But what I do say is that all of the initiatives have originated here, among the ENDESA managers; of course, consulting the National Institute of Industry or the ministry. What I have to try to clearly discern is what ENDESA can and cannot propose.

[Sierra] The opposition is attacking you, the minister, and the energy policy. Why?

[Fuster] What they are doing, rather than giving an explanation of reasons, is looking for arguments for political purposes. The electrical sector has that weakness, a certain tendency toward politicizing situations.

[Sierra] Is there a possibility of nationalizing the electrical sector, as in France or Italy, or of privatizing ENDESA?

[Fuster] It would not make sense. Nationalization, like privatization, does not introduce any ingredient of effectiveness. What matters is that the enterprises be well managed. Nationalizing entails a risk, because free competition is excluded. When there is privatization, it is generally done to earn money, not to improve management. There are as many good managers among private entrepreneurs as among public ones. If ENDESA wants to be here, it's because it knows how to develop in this business, and cut costs, not because it's public. But I am sure that there are better businesses, and if not, tell that to Mr. Botín, who left the sector, selling Viesgo to us.

[Sierra] Really, what is your opinion of Botín? Is it true that he is becoming the regime's banker, especially since he sold you that company?

[Fuster] He already knew that this cartel was going to be created, but the fact is that it was a good operation for them and for us. The bank has been freed from having 40 billion [currency not specified] attached in a company that wasn't giving it the income return that it wanted.

[Sierra] Why do your private colleagues find so much fault with the minister of industry's plan to restructure the sector, separating electrical production from distribution?

[Fuster] I think that they are exaggerating slightly. We are doing this and it is not creating any problem for us. And advocating this does not mean approving a doctoral thesis, but rather something that is already working elsewhere, such as England or the United States. I think that the model that they have now seems self-satisfactory

to them, and they are resistant to change as a necessary requirement. However, I see no ideological or conceptual reasons that would prevent them from realizing the advantages of the system proposed by the Ministry of Industry. It is the only way to generate competition in the electrical sector. Anything else means geographical monopolies. In any event, I cannot explain the arguments that someone has in mind to refute an idea. I can only explain the reasons for my abiding by the Ministry of Industry. The idea seems good to me, I am carrying it out, and it is working well for me.



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